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The efforts to fight against corruption portrayed by international and domestic actors are 
crucial in addressing measures to alleviate corruption in the mining and healthcare sectors. 
Several experts in social science research argue that transparency, public awareness, and 
oversight are practical approaches to fighting corruption in the mining and healthcare sectors 
when they receive the needed support from a working legal system and strong political will. 
This research body has provided information on how transparency, public awareness, and 
oversight are helpful to fight corruption, but principal-agent theory and collective action theory 
suggest different ideas of how these approaches can work and why they may not work. This 
thesis applies these theoretical ideas to understand anti-corruption efforts in two sectors: 
mining and healthcare. The research study was conducted based on a qualitative approach 
with specific use of interviews and document analysis as a data-gathering method. The research 
findings indicate that both mining and healthcare sectors have developed openness through 
online service provision, an effort to increases corruption risk knowledge to the public, 
expanded corruption reporting mechanisms, and improved auditing tactics that help detect 
corruption allegations. The mining sector has recently made progress in fighting corruption 
due to a good legal framework supported by the implementation of the laws. 
In comparison, the healthcare sector has little progress in fighting grand corruption due to 
rather minor expansion of controlling mechanisms to detect corrupt allegations, such as 
camera installation in the public medical stores. There is also little control of forgery 
documents made to the NHIF sheet by health personnel and external medical owners. The 
findings have implications for improving effective governance to fight corruption in these 
sectors by informing us that transparency and public awareness have a practical impact on 
reducing corruption through oversight. Because effective oversight means the ability to audit 
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1.1 Introduction  
Grand corruption, which involves high ranking government officials, is one of the global 
challenges (Mashali, 2012). The last decade has seen a convergence between domestic and 
international policy approaches towards an anti-corruption drive to fight against corrupt crime. 
The mining and healthcare sectors are among the sectors affected by grand corruption in the 
mining licence permit issuance, procurement division, and displaying revenue collected to the 
public. Grand corruption harms poor citizens in a country more than rich ones, increasing 
inequality and degrading the quality of life (Prasad et al., 2019; Olken 2006; Reinikka & 
Svwnsson 2004; Gupta et al. 1998; Kohler & Dimancesco,2020). It is also a destructive practice 
that increasingly affects economic efficiency and growth, distort public service delivery, and 
lower levels of human development (Hanna et al., 2011; Chene, 2014). However, the worst 
effect of corruption is increasing mortality rate and violating the existing human right of living, 




development (Hanna et al., 2011; Chene, 2014; Krambia-Kapardis, 2019). Policies to curb 
corruption are poorly implemented in developing countries, but it is at times in what way they 
fall short and why; thus, I intend to examine the policies that attempt to reduce corruption and 
their degree of success in the context of Tanzania (Krambia-Kapardis, 2019). The study is 
guided by a broad question that states, “What attempts have been made to reduce corruption in 
the two sectors, and why do they seem to have succeeded to a greater extent in one context than 
the other?”  I specifically intend to examine study on significant attempts made by Tanzania 
government to mitigate corruption in the mining and healthcare sector. The study is a 
comparative structured that looks at attempts to reduce corruption practice in the mining and 
healthcare sectors on achievement and little successes. 
The International anti-corruption regime is a global plan for improving the quality of 
government, which involves international procedures that include anti-corruption pledges, 
international treaties, soft laws arrangements, international advocacy campaigns, and political 
commitments (Lohaus & Gutterman, 2020). The process of implementing these plans engage 
global actors, domestic actors and non-governmental organisation that works to control bribes 
and corruption in a range of various contexts (ibid).  
The global increase of corruption has made international and domestic actors take necessary 
action to curb it from harming human life in all aspects. One of the major global initiatives 
introduced to curb corruption is the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), 
launched in September 2002 as a voluntary tool to increase transparency and alleviate 
corruption in mineral-rich states (Papyrakis et al., 2017). The EITI specifically focuses on 
revenue collection obliged for a member state to be paid by the extractive companies operating 
in the mining sector (ibid). It mainly verifies any gap that can emerge as a discrepancy between 
what the government receives as revenue and a corresponding company payment. Hence, with 
this exercise, corruption is expected to be limited and reduced (ibid). It further compliments 
that all extractive companies need to disclose their financial information flow and tax liabilities, 
which should be open to citizens to demand transparency and accountability through the multi-
stakeholder platform (ibid). 
Similarly, the world community engages multi-stakeholders like World Health Organization, 
Transparency International, national government, development partners, and civil society 




Corruption slows down achieving universal health coverage by impeding people from 
accessing quality health service delivery (Mackey et al., 2018). The WHO launched the Good 
Governance for medicine programme in 2004, aiming at preventing corruption through 
promoting transparency in the pharmaceutical division (Mackey et al., 2018). 
International and domestic actors are increasingly applying different measures to curb 
corruption at different levels of governance. However, in the analysis and results section, I 
examined how transparency, public awareness and oversight as anti-corruption measures are 
used to curb corruption in the mining and healthcare sectors. The study also looks at what has 
been introduced with these measures to reduce corruption? How have these measures worked 
to reduce corruption? And why have these measures worked differently to reduce corruption in 
different contexts.  
Additionally, the study derives a change from both principal-agent theory and collective action 
theory to develop a theoretical framework that is then applied to the two cases. The study uses 
a comparative qualitative case design to examine the measures that worked to reduce corruption 
and why these measures have succeeded in one context and fail in another. The elite informant 
interview and document analysis were gathered to examine transparency, public awareness, 
and oversight in the two sectors. Interviews were conducted with government institutions and 
NGOs to compare the evidence. The analysis uses a thematic code frame, which summarises 
the noted similarities and differences at the discussion part for all code frames presented. 
The study is organised by presenting previous research on anti-corruption policy measures, the 
case of Tanzania and the prevalence of corruption in mining and healthcare sectors, the research 
gap and what we don’t know. The next chapter presents principal-agent theory, collective action 
theory, and how theories expect to bring changes for each theoretical perspective and the 
theoretical framework. The subsequent section presents, method and design, analysis and 
results, and conclusion. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
The corrupt practices in the mining and healthcare sectors have significant effects on 
government and society by causing massive loss of public money, increase inequalities between 
poor and rich, corrosion of the quality of service delivery, higher mortality rate and violation 
of human rights (Prasad et al., 2019; Olken 2006; Kohler & Dimancesco,2020). Questions 




(Lindner & Banoba, 2014). International and domestic actors are working hard to reduce 
corruption by instituting measures to prevent and combat it from harming human beings 
(Diganyeck, 2018). Some of these measures that reduce corruption are transparency, public 
awareness and oversight (Poncian & Kigodi, 2018; Lindner & Banoba, 2014; Shah & Schacter, 
2004; Byrne et al., 2010; Avis et al., 2018). The challenges of these measures are how they 
work to reduce corruption, how they are implemented to combat corruption practices, and why 
they do not produce desirable results intended in these sectors. This study fulfils the gap by 
exploring how these efforts have attempted to reduce corruption with varying degrees of 
success in the mining and healthcare sectors. 
1.3 Significance of the study 
The study is essential for policymakers, international actors responsible for corruption 
prevention, domestic NGOs, and government to work wisely to reduce corruption and its effects 
in these sectors. Mining is the sector endowed with richness of different precious minerals like 
gold, diamond, copper, tin, tanzanite, and others (Poncian & Kigodi, 2018; Diganyeck, 2018). 
The mining sector is also a sector that contributes to the economy at five per cent and employs 
citizens and foreigners in Tanzania (Poncian & Kigodi, 2018). Due to its lucrativeness and 
massive availability of these resources in Tanzania, it attracts many small-scale and large-scale 
investors to invest in this sector with the bad eye of engaging in the corrupt practice in 
cooperation with government officials (Mashali, 2012).  
The healthcare sector is the sector that works on the health and well-being of the human body 
by providing it with curable services (Evans & Stoddart, 2017). Also, the healthcare sector is 
the sector that directly touches human life, and it receives greater attention from international 
and domestic actors by supporting it to protect human healthiness (Parviainen et al., 2019). The 
sector also faces a challenge of corruption since it is being allocated with a higher budget to 
protect human well-being (Hussmann, 2020). The higher allocation of funds earmarked to 
healthcare from international Aids and government attract health workers, suppliers and 
government officials to involve in corrupt practice and essentially distort quality of health 
service delivery (Hussmann, 2020). 
I have decided to study these two sectors because policy measures to fight corruption work in 
both sectors. Most importantly is essential to understand why these measures work well in one 




as two distinct and contradictory views of corruption, but there are good reasons to believe that 
both can help us understand the stability and possibilities to change the prevalence of corruption 
in these two sectors.  
2.0 Previous Literature on policy measures and effectiveness 
This section presents the literature review related to the anti-corruption measures and their 
effort to mitigate corruption in the mining and healthcare sectors. It provides the definition of 
the critical term corruption, anti-corruption policy, corruption practice in the mining and 
healthcare sectors, review of the empirical evidence that shows how other scholars have 
contributed their argument regarding attempts made by anti-corruption policies to mitigate 
corrupt practices in the healthcare and mining contexts. 
2.1.1 Definition of key terms 
2.1.2 Corruption 
Corruption can be defined as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain (Vian, 2020; 
Diganyeck, 2018; Kolstad et al., 2008). The practice of giving and receiving bribes in any given 
situation is regarded as the abuse of power entrusted to any person. However, the practice of 
corruption may vary depending on the country and context. In general, corruption appears in 
different forms, including bribery, absenteeism, theft, embezzlement, abuse of discretion, 
favouritism, exploiting conflict, putting private interest above public interest, and improper 
political interference (Neupane et al., 2014). Therefore, in this thesis, corruption is 
distinguished to appear as grand corruption within the healthcare and mining sectors. Grand 
corruption refers to a type of corruption involving government officials who hold decision-
making power on vital policy or contracts (Mashali, 2012). This type of corruption involves a 
large sum of money and is often played by high-profile government officials or politicians 
(Mikongoti et al., 2018). 
The existing literature bodies point out that corruption in the healthcare sector manifests in 
absenteeism habits that prevailed in developing countries (Naher et al., 2020). The author posits 
that absenteeism is made by doctors, lab technicians, and nurses in the form of stealing working 
hours for being absent from the workplace without leave and doing private practices during 
working hours (Garcia, 2019, Naher et al., 2020). Absenteeism affects the quality of health 
service delivery by providing poor health services that lack the needed quality of professional 




regime, inadequate law related to health aspects and poor implementation of health-related 
reforms (Naher et al., 2020). 
In contrast to the mining sector, corruption reveals in the form of bribe payment associated with 
the new mining site opening, which motivates high-rent activities that lead public officials 
(police, tax collectors and safety regulation inspectors) to request bribes (Knutsen et al., 2017). 
The opening of a new mining site in the local area increases income generation, business 
expansion, and labour wages. These factors promote local officials to request bribes from 
mining holders, local business people, and labourers since it is believed that they have money 
reaped from the profit generated from the mining extractions (ibid). 
The argument asserted by Knutsen et al. (2017) seems to reveal in areas where there is weakness 
in mining reforms, weak democracy, inadequate political commitment and absence of 
punishment to corrupt doers (ibid). The author acknowledges that recently, corruption in the 
extractive industries has received increasing attention, as evidenced by the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative to reduce corruption in the mining sector (ibid). 
Also, corruption in the healthcare sector manifests through petty corruption. A research work 
studied by Mndolwa (2018) presents the impacts of petty corruption on health sector 
performance. The study analysed that petty corruption creates space for favouritism, the 
persistence of unethical practice, and unfair treatment in the health sector, which undermines 
the health care sector's performance in providing health services, medical management, and 
hospital supervision. The author identified that strategies to reduce corruption in the healthcare 
sector require the government to improve remuneration benefits for medical personnel. And 
strengthening anti-corruption measures that will enhance watchdog organizations with good 
laws and regulations will help prevent and fight any form of corruption in the health care sector. 
2.1.3 Anti-Corruption   
Anti-corruption is the actions taken to prevent, curb, or oppose corruption and mitigate its 
negative impacts (Vian, 2020). It is a global initiative that involves international actors, 
transnational actors, regional actors, state actors, and individuals. International agencies have 
intensively supported organisational and governments to curb corrupt cultural habits worldwide 
(Halter et al., 2009). In the later section, I will discuss the Prevention and Combating of 
Corruption Bureau (PCCB) as the leading anti-corruption body in Tanzania, focusing on 




2.2.4 Attempts made by policy measures to mitigate corruption in healthcare and 
mining sectors 
Existing literature on transparency has been argued by various scholars from two perspectives. 
One group of researchers say that transparency is a tool that helps to reduce corruption in the 
mining sector since it propagates more on trust, the openness of information, and publishing 
the value of mineral extracted and the revenue to be paid to the government (Brusca et al., 2018; 
Brown & Cloke 2004). Transparency is a crucial tool for releasing useful information for 
institution evaluation, increasing accountability, and propagating trust among private and 
public actors (Bauhr & Grimes, 2017; Neupane et al., 2014; Etter, 2012). It is also a tool that 
can help reduce corruption by making it easy to provide incentives to public officials and help 
to maintain norms and integrity (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009).  
Furthermore, scholars in this group argue that transparency help to engage other stakeholders 
to counter check and monitor mineral operations and advises solution to what should be done 
to abolish the differences. Most importantly, it is the advice of strengthening reforms that 
modify laws and regulations on transparency by making them vital to address the concern 
identified (Poncian & Kigodi, 2018; Diganyeck, 2018; Lindner & Banoba, 2014; Huther & 
Shah 2000; Etter, 2012). However, the system of government that refers to transparency as an 
anti-corruption tool manages to control corruption by lowering its practices. Basically, the 
openness of information helps prevent bribery and fraud because the information produced is 
placed open to citizens and stakeholders who can counter-check any corruption allegation 
(Brusca et al., 2018).  
Also, transparency helps the government be more efficient, open, productive, responsible, and 
accountable for providing value-added quality service (Neupane et al., 2014). According to 
Bauhr and Grimes (2017), the essence of transparency lies in the information shared to be more 
visible in the sense of being entirely and easily accessible, straightforward, and lead to an 
accurate conclusion. Having open information that is clearly defined on the operation of 
government business, being well checked and examining its functions, helps increase trust, 
reduce corruption, and promote accountability to both actors involved in the industry. 
However, transparency is argued to be a vital tool in the mining sector that helps curb corruption 
and unethical behaviour that harm economic development by losing government revenues 




governance requires institutional, legal, and policy frameworks that consider the issue of 
transparency and accountability in the management of the mining sector.  
Furthermore, the other approach at which transparency help to mitigate corrupt actions in the 
mining and healthcare sectors is through information and communication technology that 
focuses on e-government procurement. Information and communication technology are critical 
in reducing corruption because it focuses on openness, citizen participation, effectiveness, 
efficiency, and accountability in the government's business operations. Information and 
communication technology depend on the internet to transfer data with factual and correct 
information from one point to another (Lupu & Lazar, 2015).   
In contrast to the healthcare sector, transparency can help reduce corruption when there are 
better integration and intervention of accountability and anti-corruption mechanisms to fight 
corruption based on open contracting and integrity pacts (Kohler & Dimancesco, 2020). The 
procurement of medical equipment and medicines division in the healthcare sector is prone to 
corruption impacts that harm healthcare service delivery. Also, transparency operates and 
works well in this sector when the procurement division applies an e-procurement system that 
makes the process more honest and accurate (ibid). 
E-procurement is an electronic procurement that uses information technology such as the 
internet or a web-based system designed to facilitate the government's acquisition of goods and 
services or by a private institution (Neupane et al. 2014 in Davila, Gupta & Palmer, 2003). The 
e-procurement helps facilitate the procurement process, including concrete searching, sourcing, 
negotiating, ordering, receipt, and post-purchase review (Suleiman, 2015). It plays an essential 
role in managing the public procurement process, which relies mainly on transparency. 
Neupane et al. (2014) pointed out that e-procurement assists in standardising and monitoring 
procurement, increase transparency, reduce personal discretion in purchasing decisions, 
enhance fair competition among bidders, avoid human interference, and maximise value for 
money. 
The principal-agent modal on e-procurement in the healthcare sector explains the risk of 
corruption between two parties, such as the principal and agent. The relationship between the 
principal and the agent appears during the tender administrators and bidders, leading to the 
emergency of information asymmetry when the agent has more information than the principal 




the bidder contract, the problem with the monitoring mechanism and the cost of the contracting 
process that motivates corruption practice. Also, some of the information agents might hold 
having contact information, forged documents, colluding companies, and kick-backs to 
government officials (Kohler and Dimancesco, 2020). Hence, e-procurement is an essential 
tool that can be used to fight corruption in medicine and medical equipment procurement. This 
is because e-procurement technology help to work with real-time access to information, 
automation of procurement process, tracking and monitoring, consistency in procurement, 
competition among bidders, transparency, efficiency, quality, and accountability in public 
procurement (Neupane et al., 2014; Jeppesen, 2019). 
The other group believes transparency motivates and promotes corruption when accountability 
is lacking (Bauhr & Grimes 2017). However, transparency may not reduce corruption because 
when the principal who accesses the information is increasing and may not process and interpret 
the data, corruption increases (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009). Therefore, to monitor transparency in 
reducing corruption, anti-corruption bodies should look carefully at the information produced, 
which may be a piece of goodness or false information. 
These groups of scholars provide an academic understanding of how corruption can be 
mitigated based on transparency. Thus, in the mining sector, the principal demand information 
from the agent useful to hold the agent accountable for their actions. The requested information 
requires adequate transparency to monitor, control, and enable scrutiny by lowering down the 
information access barrier (Bauhr & Grimes 2017; Persson et al., 2013; Batory, 2012). 
A second approach often cited to help fight corruption in both sectors consists of a public 
awareness campaign that helps raise public consciousness about the corruption issue. Raising 
awareness on corruption reporting is a critical tool that allows the anti-corruption body to 
reduce corruption by making it known to the public of all levels. However, communicating 
messages about corruption risk to an audience is an exceptional power that persuades, compels, 
and raises inspirational consciousness that influences the audience to take necessary action to 
prevent corruption (Byrne et al., 2010). 
The empirical evidence presented by Byrne et al. (2010) indicated that raising corruption 
awareness in society requires an effective communication strategy that increases citizens’ 




may not work if the government does not institute legal reforms that allow citizens to access 
government information and hold the government accountable (ibid). 
Also, the campaign for raising public awareness is being made specifically to disseminate 
information on the legal mechanism to combat corruption, instructing the public on how to 
report corruption and raise understanding of the different types of corruption and its risk, how 
it appears and who involve in it. It further provides knowledge about corrupt behaviour and 
practices and educates the audience on the root causes, consequences, and potential cures. 
These pieces of knowledge are crucial to make the public officials and citizens aware of the 
risks of corruption and engage in combat and prevent it from their workplace (Byrne et al., 
2010). 
Additionally, rising corruption awareness and reporting are critical approaches that aim to 
increase understanding of corruption risks to actors involved in service provisions. The 
advocated campaign on corruption knowledge helps provide a preventive mechanism for 
reporting the corrupt allegation, refusing to pay a bribe for exchange of services, and preventing 
a politician from getting involved in bad habits of corruption (Doig & Riley, 1998). 
How are these campaigns being disseminated within society?  A literature work portrayed by 
Byrne et al. (2010) argues that for anti-corruption bodies to educate the public on the risk of 
grand corruption need support from the media platform at which the message should be air and 
publishing to reach the audience. In this case, the standard method to present the message to 
the community is through radios airs, seminars, workshops, communities meeting, and 
presenting at national and periodic exhibitions (ibid).  
On the other hand, raising awareness and reporting corruption allegations works better in 
countries that follow the rule of law (Shah & Schacter, 2004). This is because educating public 
officials about corruptions risk is the governance concern that requires broader effort to 
widespread the knowledge into the community perceived corruption as a cultural norm. In this 
regard, to support anti-corruption agencies in raising public awareness campaigns is likely to 
meet with limited success in an environment where corruption is rampant and the governance 
environment is deeply flawed (ibid). The authors arrived at this argument from the incidence 
of corruption modal, which presented those countries with high corruption have a low quality 
of governance, those with medium corruption have fair governance, and those with low 




In an environment where governance is weak, an anti-corruption effort on public awareness is 
prone to be misused as a tool of political victimisation (ibid). The political intervention affects 
technical campaigns to advocate raising corruption awareness due to little budget allocation 
and stealing the funds planned for the activity. However, both existing research and experience 
related to public sector corruption for raising public awareness suggest that corruption is 
widespread, anti-corruption programs must begin with a serious effort to address the 
dysfunctional governance environment that nurtures corruption (ibid). 
The rise of public awareness campaigns manifests in both sectors in terms of similarities in 
which campaigns are provided to public officials (resident mines and health personnel) and 
investors on the general ground of the sources, impacts and ways to fight corruption. 
Differences appear in campaign raising when trainers educate public officials through seminars 
and workshops in the mining or healthcare sector (PCCB, 2019). The campaigns educate 
society on ways to fight corruption by sharing knowledge to refuse to give and receiving 
corruption and reporting any corruption allegations (ibid). 
The other attempt to reduce corruption is oversight institutions through financial audit and 
control, investigations, public account committee, media and civil society. The recently 
existing literature body considers financial audit as an independent watchdog institution that 
works on public interest, focusing on government transparency and accountability (Dye & 
Stapenhurst,1998). However, auditing promotes transparency and accountability within 
government institutions to deliver services to the community. Vian (2020) pointed out an 
empirical finding that audits help to reveal specific financial losses to corruption. This helps 
reduce the disappearance of enormous money lost due to corrupt tendencies prevalent within 
government organisations. It also helps identify and assess risk areas prone to corrupt practice 
and reveal corruption scandals (Bozek & Emerling, 2016). 
In the contemporarily existing literature body, researchers indicate that audits play two critical 
roles in the fight against corruption. These roles are prevention and detecting corruption; there 
will be less to detect if auditors prevent corruption. However, professional auditors suggest 
dealing with the prevention, which reduces corruption at a great extent although seeing it help 
auditors to initiates measure to prevent it (Jeppesen, 2019; Borge, 1999). 
Jeppesen (2019) pointed out that financial audits may detect corruption through kick-back 




as benchmarking. Also, inspections on the tender process, including price quoted actual price, 
and checks on violations of law that govern daily business activities help detect corrupt 
procurement division practices. Other techniques that might help detect corruption through 
auditing are undercover agents, auditor's observation ability, and information from the press 
which suspected the presence of corruption trends. 
Additionally, to prevent corruption, auditors work to identify areas prone to corruption and 
provide recommendations for quick reform that could introduce strong regulations or laws to 
prevent it (Jeppesen, 2019). Also, auditors may prevent corruption by reminding employees to 
follow and understand organisation policies governing the organisation's general operations. 
And that if any employee breaches any policy is then entitled to be sanctioned or relieved from 
duty. Furthermore, internal auditing control plays a vital role in preventing corruption by 
controlling proper documentation phases during the purchase of goods from the vendors. This 
happens by informing vendors to sign anti-corruption papers, which is a strong term for them 
not to engage in corrupt practices (Jeppesen, 2019). 
Regarding the above points, several researchers find that auditing is a vital oversight 
mechanism that helps detect corruption, report the audited findings, and provide 
recommendations for sanction for those involved in unethical behaviour of corruption.  Liu and 
Lin (2012) in Schelker & Eichenberger (2010), Blume & Voigt (2011) argues that auditing 
improves the transparency of public policy and reduce wasteful spending. For example, Olken 
(2007) conducted a field experiment on the monitoring effect of government auditing in 
Indonesia and concluded that when the village road projects being audited by the government 
increased from 4% to 100%, corruption (over-spending) on these projects decreased by 8% 
(Liu & Lin, 2012). Finally, auditing is an essential investigative process that needs to be tied 
up with authority to impose administrative sanctions and penalties once it detects corruption in 
public organisations (ibid). 
The other factor that adds value to oversight is that the parliamentary public account committee 
mitigates corruption through its fundamental oversight role that promotes transparency and 
accountability of government officials and private officials who operate in private companies. 
Existing literature on PAC argues that PAC can curb corruption by holding the government 
accountable through the budgetary process and exercising parliamentary oversight in 




corruption by involving officials with interviews and investigating whether policies and laws 
in public institutions are being abided by and followed by both private and public officials 
(ibid). 
Also, a camera surveillance installation aim at enhancing the security of what is happening in 
the healthcare sector (Norman et al., 2020). The camera act as a monitoring and investigative 
tool that act mostly as a deterrent factor; in other words, the simple fact of knowing that there 
is a camera may lead to people behaving better and stop stealing medicines (ibid). 
Furthermore, civil society organisations and media are essential watchdog tools that help to 
reveal any corruption practice being made in public and private institutions. There has been an 
increasing realisation that improving information disclosure and giving citizens greater right to 
decision can effectively reduce corruption. For example, Liu and Lin (2012) pointed out that 
when the central government in Uganda started publishing in a newspaper on the accounts of 
the education funds allocated to primary school, the local capture of education funds has 
reduced significantly, and student enrolment and learning have improved considerably. Hence, 
researchers argued that media are a valuable incentive that enforces corruption reduction. 
Newspapers, television, and radios are significant in publishing corruption to the electorate and 
empowering the community to punish corrupt bureaucrats. (Hanna et al., 2011; Mikongoti, et 
al.,2016). 
The recently available research on how media help reduces corruption is analysed in work 
portrayed by Byrne et al. (2010). The authors argue that media journalists investigate corruption 
allegations based on revealing wrongdoing and creating scandals. They achieve this mission 
through undercover journalist investigation, questioning and interviewing respondents on 
corruption allegations. However, media may be reflected in under or over-reporting incidents 
of corruption (ibid). The quality of news includes bias, inaccuracy, and sensational to the reader 
or viewer, requiring careful reliability to produce an amount of confirmed information to the 
public (ibid). 
3.0 The case of Tanzania 
3.1. History and reason for anti-corruption formation. 
The formation of the anti-corruption body in Tanzania was highly influenced by the widespread 
corruption in the country at different levels. Its formation is dated back to 1966 when the 




corrupt practices (Afro barometer, 2006). The government established the permanent 
commission of inquiry (Ombudsman) to check on the abuse of power. In complimenting the 
commission's work, in 1971, the government passed the Prevention of Corruption Act, leading 
to the formation of the Ant-Corruption Squad in 1975. However, in 2001, the permanent 
commission of inquiry was transformed to the Commission for Human Rights and Good 
Governance (CHRGG) through the parliament Act (ibid). 
As corruption was still prevalent three decades back, the government made an effort to 
strengthen the Anti-Corruption Squad by transforming it into the Prevention and Combating of 
Corruption Bureau (PCCB) in 2007, which addresses the fight against corruption practice at 
the specific base of prevention, investigation, promote public awareness on corruption issues 
through public education, as well as implementing anti-corruption Act at all level of 
government and private entities (Afro barometer 2006). 
During the president Mkapa administration in 1996, the president appointed the presidential 
commission Against corruption to assess the state of corruption in the country and formulate 
the recommendations. The commission produced the Warioba Report, which adopted a 
comprehensive National Ant-Corruption Strategy and Action plan (NACSAP) (Lindner & 
Banoba, 2014). The Warioba Anti-corruption Commission found that public officials engage 
in petty corruption to supplement their meagre income. In contrast, senior government officials 
engage in grand corruption to satisfy their excessive greed to accumulate wealth for their 
private gain. However, the report recommended establishing the Prevention and Combating of 
Corruption Bureau (PCCB) in Tanzania as the national instrument that alleviates corruption 
(Mikongoti et al.,2016). 
The Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB) is established under the 
Prevention and Combating of Corruption Act No 11. Of 2007. This Act was enacted after the 
repeal of the Prevention and Combating Act, chapter 329 revised in 2002. The establishment 
of this body comes after the Parliament of the United Republic of Tanzania passed the 
Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bill on April 16, 2007. The Bill was signed by the 
president Mr Jakaya Kikwete and became the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Act No 






The primary purpose of the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Act No. 11 of 2007 is set 
out in sections 4 and 7 of the Act to ensure good governance and eliminate corruption in the 
country. To ensure that this goal is met, this law creates a better legal administrative and 
operational environment focusing on prevention and combat corruption (PCCB Act No 11., 
2007; Sikoi, 2013). 
3.2 Corruption practice in the mining 
According to Diganyeck L. (2018), an allegation of corrupt practice in the mining sector was 
caused by the lack of transparency in mining contracts between the government and companies 
that are often suspected of favouring certain companies involved in mineral extraction in 
Tanzania. Also, government officials working in the mining sector engaged in corrupt practices 
when conducting mining operations, including permit issues (ibid). Additionally, tax officials 
who assessed tax in mining involved in unethical practice led to huge revenue loss to the 
government(ibid). Several assessments were carried out on tax payments made to the 
government without having a mechanism to watch out for how the amount earned was paid to 
the government (ibid). 
However, public officials working in the division of minerals from the Ministry of Energy are 
alleged to involve in corruption because of a conflict of interest by owning mineral rights. For 
example, the government awarded an improper tender to ASA due to a conflict of interest. The 
Minister of Finance and Minister of Minerals were charged with abuse of their position by 
arbitrary procuring. The ex-Minister of Finance was charged to exempt ASA from paying taxes 
worth $ 9.32 million (Diganyeck, 2018). Moreover, before the strength of mining laws in 2017, 
corruption in the mining sector led the country to lose from gaining revenue (ibid).  
Research studies portrayed by Poncian & Kigodi (2018) presented a question on how 
transparency initiatives have impacted governance and accountability in Tanzania's extractive 
sector. The study analysed that the government of Tanzania has improved and strengthened 
anti-corruption measures to fight against corrupt practices. The unethical practice of corruption 
prevailing in the mining sector due to flawed policies, weak governance, dishonesty of public 
officials, and tax evasion made by mining companies in cooperation with dishonest government 
officials (ibid). The government improved anti-corruption measures by designing new Acts and 
renewing existing Acts governing the extractive sector. The law reform has resulted in an 




the provision of information and report openly, which allowed civil society and parliament to 
oversee the trend of the mining operation and push the government on necessary changes that 
need attention and action at hand (ibid). 
Additionally, studies demonstrated by Lindner & Banoba (2014) pointed out an overview of 
corruption and anti-corruption effort made by the Tanzania government to curb corrupt 
practices in the extractive industry. The author contended that in the mining sector, the state 
regulatory capacity is undermined by rent-seeking, theft by state functionaries, and 
involvement of top officials in rent-seeking. However, mining development operations were 
associated with government officials' lack of transparency and accountability, which resulted 
in increased corrupt practices that resulted in the loss of government revenue. In curbing 
corruption challenges in the mining sector, the government adopted the initiatives advised by 
the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative by designing and tightening regulation of the 
extractive industries in Tanzania that benefit the public (ibid). Through this initiative, the 
government improved transparency and accountability and strengthened anti-corruption 
strategies to fight corruption activities in the mining sector (Poncian & Kigodi 2018). 
In a comparison study assessing corruption and anti-corruption strategies, the research work 
presented by Doig and Riley (1998) identified that corruption in Tanzania was associated with 
the inadequate political will to give the Bureau strength to act and the decline in public ethics 
in Tanzania (ibid). They further contended that corruption was dominated by clientelist links 
between business people and decision-makers, particularly politicians. However, corruption 
was rampant in the mining sector in grand corruption, which deteriorated the mining operation 
and caused the government to lose revenue. Concerning the anti-corruption strategies that can 
help curb the rampant corrupt practice that prevailed in this sector, the authors identified that 
systems like public education on the effect of corruption, prevention, and reporting the 
complaints were adopted to increase public awareness (ibid).  
Diganyeck (2018) established an argument based on a research question, which spelt out, "Are 
the laws and regulations on transparency in the mining sector in Tanzania following Extractive 
Industry Transparency Initiatives (EITI) standards?" The author identified that the mining 
sector in Tanzania faced several challenges, including corruption practices that led to the lack 
of transparency in the extractive contract. The lack of transparency raised suspicion regarding 




to other income being diverted to dishonest government officials for their private gain. Also, it 
increased tax and duties exemption that harm economic development, substantial smuggling 
activities that certify the origin of Tanzanite minerals to be not of Tanzania origin. In this 
respect, grand corruption in the mining sector was being practised by top officials with high 
rank of government position and authority who used to hold a higher level of secrecy in mining 
operations, contract, and prevention of auditing that could facilitate transparency and 
accountability. The mining sector had a higher level of grand corruption practice which 
undermined the economic development in Tanzania (ibid). 
Furthermore, in curbing corruption in this crucial sector, anti-corruption initiatives were 
introduced, like forming the prevention and combating corruption Act of 2007. The standard 
advised by the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiatives requires the mining operation to be 
transparent and accountable for government and company officials in their daily mining 
operations. Moreover, an anti-corruption initiative promoted the creation of the Tanzania 
Extract Industry and Transparency Act of 2015 in the national laws and regulations that have 
been given the mandate to regulate transparency in the mining sector (ibid). 
3.3. Corruption Practice in the Healthcare sector 
Studies have been increasingly exploring the quality of public healthcare services in the 
healthcare sector in Tanzania. The literature review indicates that corruption is one of the 
significant barriers to providing quality healthcare service in Tanzania (Kabote, 2017). This is 
because corruption leads to a lack of drugs, equipment, and other medical materials through the 
theft of drugs and medical equipment (ibid). On the other hand, an effort to reduce corruption 
in the healthcare sector is not impressive because the phenomenon is complicated and 
challenging in the healthcare sector (ibid). However, to mitigate corrupt practices in the 
healthcare sector, the government is advised to improve the operation of anti-corruption bodies 
by initiating strong labour laws that will effectively prevent healthcare personnel from not 
engaging in corrupt practices. Improving remuneration payment to healthcare workers ensures 
that healthcare workers are responsive and accountable to their professional duties (ibid) 
Also, the study argument presented by Kohler (2011) indicates that the procurement of public 
drugs is susceptible to corruption because drugs volumes are large, and contracts are often of 
immense benefits. However, it motivates some dishonest actors to engage in corrupt actions. 




and sometimes suppliers may bribe procurement officials to gain an advantage in the tender 
procurement process (ibid). It also occurs in the form of overpayment of products when there 
is no justifiable healthcare reason. This affects healthcare performance to poor people who 
might have insufficient funds to pay for healthcare services (ibid). 
Additionally, the act of stealing, embezzlement and overbilling affect access to needed 
medicine, equipment, and supplies. For example, in Togo, a government audit discovered that 
a third of the ant-malaria medicines provided by the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis 
and Malaria, worth over US $1 million, had been stolen (Hussmann, 2020). 
According to research studies conducted by PCCB (2008), the healthcare sector is a tempting 
target for corruption because it requires significant public funds. Most countries commit 5-15 
per cent of their income to the healthcare sector, making it an enticing target for corruption. 
Abuse can take many forms like unplanned payment to patients, theft of drugs and equipment, 
and use of the public property for personal benefit. (Van Lerbergh et al, 2002; PCCB, 2008). 
However, low pay, the lack of a proper system of incentive, desire, demand from customers, 
steal of medical tools, and the attitude of workers to see that soliciting and accepting bribes is 
standard practice. These facts lead to employees of the healthcare sector engaging in unethical, 
corrupt practices (Kamuzora, 2005). 
In addition, public education awareness is an anti-corruption approach to increase 
understanding of corruption effects on patients, suppliers and healthcare personnel. For 
example, the study conducted at Muhimbili national hospital by PCCB in 2008 was performed 
using a primary and secondary source of data collection. The research focuses on an interview 
with 453 healthcare workers respondents and group discussion as the primary source of data 
collection. In contrast, secondary data was based on a literature review which identified that 
public healthcare employees are prone to corruption. The research finding detected that 
pharmacists are alleged to be corrupt at 87.5%, laboratory technicians at 80%, nurses at 65.9%, 
radiographers at 64.7%, doctors at 59%, and record-keeping at 12.5%. 
Also, with the above findings, public awareness is considered as an approach that helps to raise 
awareness and understanding of corruption risks and their effects on an individual level (Doig 
& Riley, 1998). The more people get aware of the impact of corrupt practice, the more they 
prevent, combat, and fight it. Does this approach work to prevent corruption? It has little 




allegations that requires investigation and prosecution to court. And it has helped societies not 
to engage in corrupt practices due to the raised awareness of the harmful effects of corruption 
(Doig & Riley, 1998; Reinikka & Svensson, 2002). 
However, this approach might not produce the desired outcome of reducing corruption in other 
contexts due to a lack of honesty between two actors who engage in corruption. As per 
collective action theory, a corrupt practice that perceives actors' mindset produces dishonest 
behaviour within actors involved in this dilemma. Hence, honesty required to prevent 
corruption might not work because honesty is simply not a rational strategy where corruption 
is considered normal (Persson et al. l, 2013). 
3.4.0 Ant-corruption action taken by Tanzania government to reduce corruption in the 
mining and healthcare sectors. 
3.4.1 Ant-corruption effort in the mining sector 
One of the significant anti-corruption efforts made by the Tanzania government to fight 
corruption in the extractive industries was to adopt the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI) standard requirements (Poncian & Kigodi 2018). The standard requirement 
adopted was to monitor what the extractive companies pay as revenue to the government and 
confirmation of receipt of revenue by the government from the extractive companies 
(Diganyeck, 2018). The government decided to reform the law known as Tanzania Extractive 
Industry Transparency Act in 2015 to work on the gas, oil, and mining sector (ibid). 
The other action adopted by the Tanzania government was the use of a public awareness 
campaign that aimed to raise awareness in society about the harmful risk of corruption (Doig 
& Riley, 1998). The government strengthened the anti-corruption body (PCCB) with the Act 
of 2007 that repealed the previous anti-corruption squad Act of 1975, which increased efforts 
to make the public aware of corruption risks at all levels (Lindner & Banoba, 2014; Afro 
barometer, 2006). The directorate of public education in PCCB initiated measures to educate 
the public through radio and Tv airing programs, seminars to public officials working in mining 
sectors, and conducted work ethic oaths to public officials to reduce corruption in this sector 
(PCCB, 2018). Furthermore, the PCCB investigates suspected corruption incidents and takes 




Also, Oversight action was adopted to watch and detect corruption trends in the extractive 
industries by using a parliamentary public account committee. The PAC in Tanzania had the 
power to investigate the trend of mining operations in Tanzania and advised the government to 
reform laws that would help corrupt control activities in the mining sector (Stapenhurst et al., 
2006).  The controller and audit general carried out the power to audit the mining sector before 
2010; after the reformation of the mining act of 2010, auditing management was shifted to the 
Mining Commission (Diganyeck L. (2018). 
 
 
3.4.2 Ant-corruption effort in the healthcare sector 
The government of Tanzania adopted a raising awareness campaign to the community, 
including health workers, on the negative effect of corruption on the sector (Rahman et al., 
2019). The anti-corruption body (PCCB) in corporation with other stakeholders like SIKIKA 
worked hard to educate health workers and patients, especially pregnant women, on the 
importance of not engaging in corrupt practice (PCCB, 2008, PCCB 2018; SIKIKA, 2010).  
The other initiative adopted in Tanzania to reduce corruption was through transparency in 
medical procurement, which was analysed to be used in the Public Procurement Act No 7 of 
2011. The initiative worked at the infant level of its practicability in Tanzania with little impact 
to reduce corruption due to policy and legislative framework, institutional structures and 
information and communication technology challenges (Suleiman, 2015). The WHO enhanced 
the initiatives to strengthen institutional capacity for the performance of testing drugs at the 
border and importation site to reduce importation of fake drugs under the ground of corruption 
(Mamdani et al., 2018). 
The history of corruption in Tanzania dates back after independence in 1961, and ant-corruption 
measure to fight corruption was adopted from 1966 when the government recognised that pubic 
officials were corrupt (Afro barometer, 2006). The earlier initiative was to establish the 
permanent commission of inquiry (Ombudsman) to check on the abuse of power (ibid). The 
government established the permanent commission of inquiry (Ombudsman) to review the 
abuse of power. The government passed the anti-corruption Act in 1971 to fight corruption in 





The below graph presents a cross-time evolution of corruption for Transparency International 
in Tanzania compared to Kenya and Uganda from 2012 to 2020, in which data were available. 
 
Source: Corruption Perception index 2020 
The above graph indicates that in 2020, Tanzania scored 38% out of 100% and ranked 94 out 
of 180 countries in fighting corruption compared to Uganda and Kenya, where Uganda scored 
27% out of 100% and ranked 142 out of 180 countries while Kenya scored 31% out of 100% 
and ranked 124 out of 180 countries. According to the corruption perception index, Tanzania 
has made significant progress in fighting corruption at a +3 score change point since 2012 
compared to Uganda with a -2 score change point.  
3.5 Research gap, Development 
There has been inadequate research made to examine the effectiveness of anti-corruption 
policies in comparative case studies for its efforts to mitigate corruption in the mining and 
healthcare sectors. Instead, there are separate researches made to reduce corruption in 
healthcare and mining sectors in different ways, mainly by looking into several anti-corruption 
bodies, policies, and strategies. This study fills the gap by helping us understand how corruption 
has been reduced in both sectors by looking at what has been done, how anti-corruption 


























































































































































































































































































Figure 1.0 Comparability of Corruption Perception 
Index between Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda since 
2012 to 2020




However, in comparing these two cases, the study provides a learning mechanism of 
understanding that anti-corruption measures work effectively to control corruption when 
oversight is left to prevail with solid support from the legal instrument. Also, the comparability 
of the study provides an understanding of corruption prevailed in both sectors and solutions 
contributed by the same anti-corruption measures in different mechanisms. Furthermore, other 
studies focus on mapping policy initiatives and progress, but comparing two sectors provides 
greater opportunities to understand why similar initiatives can succeed in one sector but fall 
short in another. The thesis expects to shed light on the effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts 
to reduce corruption in two sectors.   
3.6. What we don't know- Research question 
The research question in this study is guided by the question that starts on “What attempts have 
been made to reduce corruption in the two sectors, and why do they seem to have succeeded to 
a greater extent in one context than the other?” 
The mining sector is one of the sectors that contribute to the advancement of economic growth 
in Tanzania at a level of 5% (Poncian & Kigodi, 2018). Although it faced corruption challenges 
involving dishonest government officials, mining companies were not paying corporate tax, 
mis invoicing, alleged to have engaged with tax evasion, and inadequate policies and laws 
implementation used to govern the extractive industry. These challenges fostered the fifth phase 
government to institute strong anti-corruption measures through Extractive Industry and 
Transparency Initiatives. Through these action measures, corruption practice in the mining 
sector has been decreased due to the improvement of transparency, accountability, and 
strengthening extractive governance by introducing a number of laws, standards, and 
regulations that govern and control the trend of mining revenue collection, which benefit both 
government and investors, (Poncian & Kigodi, 2018). 
While the healthcare sector is one of the critical sectors that need greater attention in handling 
its daily operation. The industry faces the corrupt challenge due to vast amounts of resources, 
information asymmetry, a higher number of international and national actors, and the supply 
chain system of drugs and medical devices (Hussmann, 2020). There has been an increase in 
corruption effects in hospital management, in the informal payment for healthcare services, 




The healthcare sector ranked third with a high incidence of corrupt practices in 2006 and 2014 
(Afro Barometer report, 2006; Lindner & Banoba, 2014). Also, Transparency International 
(2011) ranked the healthcare sector as the third sector with higher corruption practice in 
Tanzania. The Global Corruption Barometer reflected that the healthcare sector in Tanzania is 
among the most corrupt sector in the third position after the police 87%, the judiciary 86%, 
healthcare 79%, civil service 75%, and the education system 74% (Transparent International, 
2013).  
Therefore, due to the higher level of corruption practice prevailing in the healthcare sector and 
the low level of action taken to curb it. And the importance for this sector is to touch human 
beings' lives directly by providing curing, healthcare checks up, improving human well-being 
and strengthening their healthcare for them to continue working and produce economic stakes 
for country development. There is an important space to study the effort to reduce corruption 
in this crucial sector and provide advice and recommendation on what can be done to alleviate 
corruption from harming this sector. (Transparent International, 2013).  
However, in Tanzania, a high level of corruption practice has been widely spread in all aspects 
of public administration for decades. It has become an experienced feature for the citizen to 
interact with the state on public goods provision. The country has little progress in 
implementing anti-corruption efforts against fighting illicit corruption practices. Despite the 
effort demonstrated by late president Magufuli on renewing anti-corruption efforts, few 
changes are portrayed to decrease corruption in the country (Camargo & Koechlin, 2018).   
4.0 Theories 
This study is guided by two theories: The principal-agent theory and the collective action 
theory. Both approaches help us understand how anti-corruption measures might reduce 
corruption. In this section, I will start presenting the principal-agent theory by looking at the 
underlined relationship between the principal and agent to understand whether their 
relationship helps remove corruption or fail to do so. And lastly, I will discuss the collective 
action theory looking at the corrupt behaviour perceived by both the principal and agent 
involved in the business transaction. 
4.1 The Principal-Agent Theory 
The principal-agent theory helps us to understand how anti-corruption intervention may help 




there is tension in organisational relationship raised between the "principal" who demand the 
service and the" agent" who provide it (Kayode et al., 2013; Ngata, 2016). In the political 
science literature, the principal-agent theory describes a situation in which a principal requires 
the service of an agent but lack the information necessary to oversee the performance of the 
agent effectively, which may motivate the agent to engage in corrupt acts (Carson & Prado 
2016). The emphasis point is that the cause of corruption activities relies on the lack of 
necessary information related to the service demanded by the principal, who could hold the 
agent accountable for their actions and responsibilities (Bauhr & Grimes 2017).  
The theory suggests that a solution to mitigate corruption might possibly be the successful 
implementation of anti-corruption measures (Persson et al., 2013). The anti-corruption 
measures based on the principal-agent framework relies on the ability of the principal willing 
to hold the agent (corrupt officials) accountable for their actions (Persson et al., 2013). The 
broader willingness for the principal to reduce corruption might work on introducing substantial 
legal reforms, effective monitoring mechanisms and vigorous punishment (ibid). If the 
principal develops an ability to control information from the agent through either transparency, 
auditing or awareness-raising, then corruption practice will be lowered.   
Also, for this study, the principal is considered to be citizen, investors or government officials 
who are supposed to be audited by other government offices or companies, while the agent is 
considered to be companies or public officials working in the mining sector. It can also be vice 
versa depending on the environment where corruption and services are being done (Persson et 
al., 2013). 
The challenge that might impede the principal-agent relationship not to reduce corruption is 
inadequate financial resources to fund institutions that work to promote anti-corruption 
measures to reduce corruption. However, the other challenge might be the weakness of state 
capacity to regulate policies and enforce them to effectively work to reduce corruption. In other 
words, the principal may be too weak, unwilling or unable to hold the agent accountable. 
4.2 The Collective Action Theory 
This is the relevant theory that helps us understand why anti-corruption efforts may not produce 
the desired result designed to curb corruption. The theory posits that corruption appears and 
persists when a group of actors act dishonestly, and none of the actors takes on the role of the 




further asserts that corruption arises when no explicit and legitimate effective leadership exists 
to regulate public or common goods (Marquette & Peiffer,2015).  
The theory suggests that in an environment where everyone or a group of actors are believed 
to engage in corruption, then corruption prevail since the group of actors lack trust. Also, the 
theory predicts that a group of actors involve in the corrupt act will continue to do so when it 
is in their individual self-interest (ibid). Hence it encourages corruption to be considered as an 
experienced and expected behaviour (Persson et al. 2013).  
In this regard, there will be no group of actors willing to act honestly in a collective action 
framework because corruption is perceived as behaviour within the service providers and 
receivers. The anti-corruption effort will not produce a better result to reduce corruption due to 
a lack of honest actors to play honestly during service provision (Persson et al., 2013).  
Furthermore, the relevant way that might be able to reduce corruption in the context of this 
theory is applying vital broad-based transparency requirements, greatly increasing monitoring 
mechanisms, and strengthening sanctions on those engaging in corrupt practices (Marquette & 
Peiffer,2015; Persson et al. 2013). Such measures might lead actors to feel that other relevant 
actors will behave honestly, therefore increasing their own willingness to do so. 
The greater challenges for this theory rely on the lack of honesty and the decrease of trust rather 
than the increase played by each group of actors, that is, principal and agent.  
The below chapter presents the view of the change in detail, following the policy initiative that 
shows how changes can appear in the line of collective action theory and principal-agent theory 
5.0 How theories expect to bring changes for different policy measures, from each 
theoretical perspective 
The anti-corruption policy regime suggests numerous approaches to reducing corruption. This 
section discusses a few of the main approaches and spells out their changes from the perspective 
of principal-agent theory as well as collective action theory. The expected changes to fight 
corruption is discussed on the policy measures of transparency, public awareness, and oversight 




The principal-agent theory predicts to bring changes when legal frameworks are passed and 
that there are principals who act on the honest side to monitor the agent and punish the violation 
of those passed laws and rules (Persson et al., 2013). 
Transparency in the mining sector entails the publication of revenue collected from investors 
to the government in a way that it becomes known to the public. This is effectively done due 
to a passed law that requires the principal (e.g., TEITI) to monitor the payment from the agent 
(e.g., extractive companies). When the agent refuses to pay revenue on time, the principal 
punishes the agent for their action of not paying revenue. In this respect, the principal-agent 
theory is helpful to reduce corruption through the transparency lens in the mining sector 
(Persson et al., 2013; Poncian & Kigodi, 2018). 
Similarly, in the healthcare sector, transparency can take the form of e-procurement that 
requires the procurement of health commodities to be open, impartial and without fraud 
(Neupane et al., 2014). Then, the policy that supervises e-procurement gives the principal's 
ability (e.g., auditors, CSOs and health team) to monitor the agent (e.g., Pharmacists, hospital 
directors) on the effective use of the e-procurement system and reduce the probability of 
engaging in corruption activities. 
Collective action theory predicts to reduce corruption when there is an increase of officials who 
act on the honest side and see other officials have increased trust (Persson et al., 2013). It is 
considered that honesty is a critical component that helps minimise corruption (Persson et al., 
2013). If actors that previously engaged in corruption begin to believe that other actors are 
beginning to behave in an honest way, then they will be more inclined to behave honestly 
themselves and reduce corruption. Hence, corrupt behaviour might exhibit more significant 
changes when all actors are willing to follow rules that emphasise transparency which increases 
trust among actors involved in service provision and receiving (Persson et al., 2013). 
According to the principal-agent theory, public awareness can bring change for reducing 
corruption when there is a higher level of raising awareness, especially among principals. In 
this case, the public awareness campaigns talk about the harmful effects of corruption risk and 
knowledge of reporting mechanisms, which help to raise understanding of how corruption 
should be reduced (Doig & Riley, 1998; Reinikka & Svensson, 2002). The raised awareness is 
exercised from the law that governs the prevention of corruption through educating the society, 




reporting the corrupt allegation to the anti-corruption body. The anti-corruption body works to 
institute punishment and sanctions to the agent engaged in the corruption act. The centre change 
is to see more vigilance and reporting from the public and refusal to pay corruption for 
exchange of service delivery (Byrne et al., 2010). 
In addition, collective action theory might possibly seem to bring changes when corruption 
knowledge about its risks in government trust increases (Persson et al., 2013).  A good level of 
government trust in business operation induces honest behaviour between government and 
suppliers during the business transaction and service delivery (Persson et al., 2013). However, 
this attribution might effectively reduce corruption when the relationship between the group of 
actors (principal and agent) grows to understand corruption risks and start believing that other 
groups of actors act on the honest side (Persson et al., 2013). It is hard to control the perception 
of other group of actors on their corruption trend, yet a group that refuses to engage in corrupt 
behaviour helps to increase honesty in other groups where corruption might expect to be 
reduced (Doig & Riley, 1998; Reinikka & Svensson, 2002).  
The other challenge associated with the collective action theory to bring changes to reduce 
corruption is a shortage of funds to support training, workshops, and seminars. But also, 
inadequate human resource to work on raising awareness through education is a problem 
because they are few of them (Byrne et al., 2010).  
With respect to oversight, principal-agent theory expects to reduce corruption when the 
principal (oversight institutions (including auditing, public account committee, media, and civil 
society organisations) effectively monitors the agent (public institutions) to detect corruption 
acts, then corruption diminishes (Dye & Stapenhurst,1998). The corruption allegation detected 
due to the effective effort of the principal (auditing and checks) helps produce punishment 
mechanisms to corrupt practices (Stapenhurst et al., 2006; Liu & Lin, 2012). The punishment 
mechanism includes removal from work and taken to court (Liu & Lin, 2012). Also, the 
principal and agent relationship creates a mechanism for both actors to respect laws, follow 
laws, and strengthen laws that develop mechanisms to remove corruption loopholes within 
mining and healthcare sectors (Persson et al., 2013).  
Furthermore, the increase of oversight institutions that work under strong laws which include 
a fundamental right to freedom of expression might cause an increased trust between the 




limited freedom of the press, inadequate laws that propagate on transparency and oversight 
institutions to be politicised. Therefore, public oversight institutions that work on auditing 
public and private resources counter checking the utilisation of public monies and publishing 
corrupt allegations investigated by media journalists and auditors are helpful in reducing 
corruption when both actors believe each other to act on the honest side (Hanna et al., 2011; 
Mikongoti et al.,2016). 
6. 0 Theoretical and Analytical Framework 
The analytical framework of this study is presented to understand attempts to reduce corruption 
in the healthcare and mining sectors. The framework indicates necessary anti-corruption 
measures to mitigate corruption in these crucial sectors. In the mining sector, transparency helps 
to make some mining contract terms open like revenue collection, monitored, and controlled 
by public oversight institutions, which are public account committees from the parliament and 
financial auditing. While in the healthcare sector that could use e-procurement to increase 
transparency and accountability on tendering and procurement processes operate at the infant 
stage and causing more loss of government funds (Suleiman, 2015). 
Also, the other anti-corruption attempt is the use of public awareness propagated in the mining 
and healthcare sectors. Public awareness helps reduce corruption in both sectors through public 
education, which raises consciousness and understanding of corruption that enhances reporting 
corrupt claims to the anti-corruption body. Reporting enables the anti-corruption body to 
conduct a secret and open investigation and present it to the court for judgement. However, 
what helps the public awareness work is education given to the community in the mining and 
healthcare sectors, which increases reporting corrupt claims whenever they detect it. This help 
to widen and expand investigation on corrupt allegation reported to the anti-corruption body. 
But it may not work in other circumstances due to corruption practices being perceived as a 
norm behaviour where honest between two actors is lacking. 
Additionally, public oversight institutions have been helping to alleviate corruption in both 
sectors. It has increased strong initiative to monitor the trend of the mining operation by doing 
several investigations and provides a recommendation to the government for necessary action 
that includes renegotiation and sanction of government officials involved in corrupt practices. 
The text above outlines how the two theoretical approaches conceptualise the link between 




attempt to reduce corruption. The analytical framework below summarises these points and 
provides a guide for the empirical analyses. 
6.1 How theories predict to reduce corruption for Different Policies Initiatives. 
Anti-corruption strategies to 
reduce corruption 
Principal-Agent Theory 
on reducing corruption 
Collective Action Theory    
on reducing corruption 
Possible Challenges for two 
theories not to reduce corruption 
Transparency and monitoring 
• Contract to be open 








• Official see that 
others are honest 
• Greater willingness 
to follow rules 
 
• Inadequate of financial 
resources 
• Weak enforcement 
• Weak capacity 
• Trust decreases rather 
than increases 
• Experienced corrupt 
behaviour 
Public Awareness 
• Negative effects of 
corruption 
• Knowledge of 
reporting mechanism 
• More vigilance 
and reporting 
from the public 
• Refusal to pay 
bribes 
• Trust in government 





• Shortage of Funds 
• Shortage of human 
resources 
• Expensive to conduct 
training and seminars 
• Awareness increasing, 
but reporting does not 
Public Oversight institutions. 
• Auditing public and 
private resources 
• Counter checking 
utilisation of public 
monies 







• Increase trust 
between government 
and private sectors 
 
• Limit of freedom of the 
press 
• Lack of laws that 
propagate transparency 
for media and civil 
societies 
• Oversight institutions 
defunded 
• Oversight institutions 
politicised 
Note: Compilation of the theories derived by the author 
The table above summarises the section that presented theories, theoretical and framework 
discussion, in which principal-agent theory and collective action theory ascribe different 
mechanisms to the same policy measures (transparency, public awareness and oversight) on 




theories not to reduce corruption as expected. However, the table summarises how principal-
agent and collective action theories might expect to reduce corruption or fail, presented in 
section 5.0, which states how theories predict reducing corruption for different policy measures 
from each theoretical perspective. 
7.0 Research Method and Design  
The research question in this study spells out that “What attempts have been made to reduce 
corruption in the two sectors, and why do they seem to have succeeded to a greater extent in 
one context than the other?” The research question intends to look at the attempt to reduce 
corruption practice in mining and healthcare sectors in Tanzania and examine the policies that 
attempt to reduce corruption and understand their degree of success. The study is a comparative 
that looks at attempts to reduce corruption practice in the mining sector with good achievement 
and the healthcare sector with little success.  
Basically, a case study design takes into consideration in qualitative research setting when the 
focus of the study is concentrated on answering the question related to "how" and "why" 
(Baxter & Jack, 2008; Yin, 2003). It is also used to respond to how and why some social 
phenomenon event works (Liyambo, 2013; Yin, 2009). A "what" question is asked in the 
qualitative study to determine an in-depth description, exploration, or explanation of the 
phenomenon. In the context of this study, a comparative qualitative case design is used to 
explore the efforts made to combat corruption and why these efforts have succeeded in one 
context and fail in the other. Basically, the qualitative case design of this study focus on 
obtaining data through a primary source, that is, the use of elite informant interviews and the 
secondary source through literature reviews.   
The study uses the Most similar System Design (MSSD), which requires a similar variable to 
be investigated on a similar phenomenon, match their contextual investigated patterns, and 
arrive at the notable differences (Anckar, 2008). However, the application of MSSD is relevant 
to explain the contextual factors that play a role to minimize corruption in the mining and 
healthcare sectors (Gerring, 2006). These factors are transparency, public awareness, and 
oversight which have been described in the discussion by noting their similarities (matching) 
and differences. However, comparing two sectors in the same country helps also to account for 




7.1 Data Collection 
This study's data collection is based on an elite informant interview, which involves an in-depth 
interaction conversation between the interviewee and the interviewer. But also, data is collected 
through documentation basing on the literature review, policy documents, both government and 
civil society organisations. These two methods, interview and documentation, have been 
selected out of six sources of evidence for case study research, namely documentation, archival 
records, interviews, direct observation, participant observation and physical artefacts as 
identified by Liyambo (2013) in Yin (2009). However, to increase the quality of the study, it is 
advised to use two or more sources that might be useful for analysis of the evidence collected 
and link the relationship between the interview questions, data gathered, and research question, 
Liyambo, (2013) in Yin, (2009).  
The interview is a conversation beyond ordinary conversation, and it involves questioning and 
active listening between an interviewee and interviewer (Kvale, 1995). It further entails 
straightforward questions requiring regular checking on the knowledge gathered to obtain the 
intended facts. Hence, this research study uses an open-ended question structure that is formed 
from semi-structured interviewing. The use of semi-structured interviews guides me to open 
my mind to the open-ended, designed question and allow the participant to provide information 
on the attempt to reduce corruption in the healthcare and mining sector (Bryman, 2016; Riach, 
2009). 
Also, during the interviewing process, I informed the interviewees of the purpose of the study. 
And I was well prepared to ask an intended question, stay calm while listening actively to the 
interviewee, and use audio recording for easy data reference and check (Roulston & Choi, 
2018). 
7.2 Operationalisation of the Variables 
7.3 Dependent Variables 
The thesis aims to examine the attempts made to reduce corruption in the mining and healthcare 
sectors and why they seem to have succeeded to a greater extent in one context than the other. 
The dependent variable is corruption in the form of grand corruption, operationalised from the 
interviews and document analysis to determine whether corruption has decreased in two 
sectors. It should be noted that corruption is a broad concept that encompasses different aspects. 




absenteeism, theft, embezzlement, abuse of discretion, favouritism, and improper political 
interference.  
7.4 Independent Variable 
The independent variables that affect the reduction of corruption in mining and healthcare 
sectors are transparency, public awareness and oversight, which are all operationalised from 
the interviews and document analysis to help us understand whether these variables help reduce 
corruption in these two sectors.  Transparency is a broad concept that covers many things as 
initiatives or policy measures that work to reduce corruption. In this thesis, transparency in the 
mining sector means accountability, integrity, and openness of information to the public 
through the publication of reports online and in the media. It also entails online applications for 
mining licensing permits and reconciliation of reports to be open to citizens and multi-
stakeholders. In contrast to the healthcare sector, transparency means putting advertisement of 
a health service cost on the notice board and on doctor’s door, online procurement of health 
commodities, accountability, integrity and making information open to the public through the 
publication of reports online and media. 
Public awareness in the mining sector means raising awareness campaigns and education on 
the risk of corruption and its impacts and making it known to the public through the platform 
of seminars, workshops, radio, social media, and exhibitions. It is entails training about the risk 
of corruption in the sectors to small-scale and large-scale miners and public officials. It further 
means training health personnel and pregnant women on the risk of corruption and helps to 
raise awareness for reducing the mortality rate accounted for corruption ground. Contrary to 
the healthcare sector, public awareness means raising the understanding of corruption 
knowledge to citizens, health officials and multi-stakeholder actors to raise awareness of 
corruption risk and its impact on the sector. However, the knowledge of corruption aims to 
make people aware of the impact of the corruption and take necessary preventive measures 
from its prevalence in mining and healthcare sectors through reporting corruption allegations 
and refusing to pay corruption during service provision. 
Oversight in this thesis means auditing financial and compliance to detect corruption through 
observation abilities of auditors, kick-back, benchmarking, informant, interviewing. It also 
entails the publication of audited reports to the public to read and detect corruption allegations 




Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative to monitor obliged revenue paid to the 
government and publishing reconciliation report and mining commission that inspects minerals 
in the ground,  produced, and sold per mining site (TEITA Act, 2015; Mining Act, 2010). 
Auditing in mining sectors involves civil society organisations, parliament and investigative 
journalist. In contrast to healthcare sector oversight means auditing made by Auditor General, 
inspection by health team from the ministry of health, regional, and district levels and publish 
corruption allegation to the public.  
The study interpreted results derived from interviews and document analysis through a thematic 
code framework structured in three questions, what efforts have been introduced, how have 
these efforts worked, and why have these measures worked differently to reduce corruption in 
a different context? 
7.5 Ethical considerations.  
The ethical consideration in a qualitative study is an important aspect that looks at reducing 
harm to participants (Shaw, 2003). However, the ethical review used in this study is 
confidentiality, in which interviewees demanded their contributed interviews be treated 
anonymously (Patton, 2002). However, the study faces possible bias in getting more data from 
private institutions than from government organisations. 
7.6 Limitation of the research study 
One of the possible limitations of the study was on how to meet with interviewee participants. 
Some interviewees did not allow me to meet them face to face due to Covid-19, and we 
switched to online, which also took a long time to have a meeting. Also, getting data from the 
Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB) was not an easy task because PCCB 
operates more on a secret base than in an open way. The other limitation was on little 
availability of funds that could accommodate several travels around the country to meet with 
respondents. 
7.7 Sample Selection 
The study sample used in this research body was thirteen elite informant interviewees, of which 
eight were from non-governmental institutions and five from government institutions. Elite 




of Corruption Bureau (PCCB) Tanzania-1, Tanzania Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (TEITI)-1, Mining Commission-2, and Bagamoyo Hospital-1. And elite informant 
interviewees from private institutions included Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC)-1, 
WAJIBU-2, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS)-2, SIKIKA-1, HakiRasilimali-1, and Policy 
Forum-1. However, I also used literature reviews, journals, books, and reports on the attempts 
to fight corruption in both sectors. 
7.8 Justification of Interview Sample Selected 
The interviews selected are from the high level of public and private institutions working on 
anti-corruption and local NGOs having more information about how anti-corruption measures 
through PCCB and other institutions work to prevent corruption in Tanzania at different levels. 
Key informant respondents in the institutions mentioned above work on anti-corruption issues 
in cooperation with PCCB in preventing corruption in Tanzania (Johnsøn et al. 2016).  
Also, the selection of LHRC, WAJIBU, KAS, HakiRasilimali, Policy Forum and SIKIKA have 
been selected because they are the partner working with PCCB. Their primary role is to mitigate 
corruption at different levels and have a high level of information about how PCCB work to 
alleviate corruption in Tanzania. I considered the interviewees as a reliable source of 
information because they are working as heads of the division of ant-corruption measures in 
their organisation. The bias that I encountered from government officials was that few of them 
were likely to give information on positiveness and try to hide the weakness, although the 
structured interview guide questions managed to explore the reality of the findings.  
Document in the analysis part requires data to be examined and interpreted so as to elicit 
meaning, gain understanding, and develop empirical knowledge necessary to answer the 
research question (Bowen, 2009). However, the study used documents related to how measures 
prevent corruption in the analysis part. The used documents for systematic evaluation in the 
analysis part are from the background paper, working papers, reviews, books, journals, and 
reports (Bowen, 2009).   
8.0 Analysis and Results 
The study's research findings are structured according to a thematic code frame that categorises 
several points to discuss efforts made to mitigate corruption in the mining and healthcare 




measure in two sectors: what efforts have been introduced, how have these efforts worked, and 
why have these measures worked differently to reduce corruption in different contexts. 
8.1.0 What efforts have been introduced?  
8.1.1. Transparency 
According to shared experience from informants, this study found that the government of 
Tanzania use transparency as an anti-corruption measure in the mining sector. This is done by 
implementing the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) principles and criteria 
from 2009 when the country joined the initiative looking at how the EITI can reduce corruption 
in Tanzania. To strengthen transparency and accountability, the Prevention and Combating of 
Corruption Bureau (PCCB), in cooperation with other stakeholders from civil society 
organisations, advised the government to institute reform by putting the TEITI legal 
framework, namely Tanzania Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Act (TEITA) of 
2015, in the national laws (Lindner & Banoba, 2014; Policy Forum, 2015; Mikongoti et al., 
2018; Diganyeck, 2018; Poncian & Kigodi, 2018; PCCB,2019). For example, informants 
interviewed from government and private NGOs shared the below information regarding TEITI 
Act. 
       …Tanzania got its TEITI Act in 2015, which demanded extractive industry operate its 
activities based on transparency…. 
     …In Tanzania, we got TEIT Act four to five years back, which requires contracts to be open 
to the public for them to interrogate it….. 
According to principal-agent theory, the transparency reform in Tanzania informs us that the 
principal (TEITI, EITI and Stakeholders) work to monitor the agent (extractive companies) on 
their corrupt acts (Persson et al., 2013). This is done through Tanzania Extractive Industries 
Transparency Act (TEITA) registered law that helps to give the principal ability to access 
information of the agent (extractive sector) and disrupt their power to engage in corrupt 
activities (Poncian & Kigodi 2018). It also enables the principal (citizens) to effectively 
participate and interrogate, reconciling payments made by agents (companies) and those 
received by the government for further action. Poncian & Kigodi (2018) argued that adopting 
the TEITA Act of 2015 has enhanced the extractive industry in Tanzania to operate on 




participation through the reconciliation of payment made by companies to the government and 
what the government have received from extractive companies (ibid). 
Additionally, as per an informant from a government institution, the Tanzania Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative uses transparency to make revenue collected from mining 
companies openly known to the public. The income collected from mining operating companies 
is directly paid to the Local Government Authority where the extractive industry operates, 
Tanzania Revenue Authority, Mining Commission and Tanzania Petroleum Development 
Corporation. The Local Government Authority receives service levy; Mining Commission 
receives license fees, application fees, and annual rent fees; TRA receives tax paid like 
corporate tax, withholding tax, and value-added tax. However, TPDC receives taxes related to 
oil and gas (TEITI, 2021; Poncian & Kigodi, 2018). 
    …. basically, we prepare a template for the extractive mining sector to fill for what they have 
paid. This template is also sent to government authority received tax paid by extractive 
companies. These government authorities include Local government authority, TRA, TPDC 
and Mining Commission….(Government Representative) 
Furthermore, according to the TEITA Act of 2015, TEITI prepares a template form for the 
extractive industry and government to fill in on what has been paid and received yearly (TEITI, 
2021). In order to monitor transparency on its realistic practical, the template filled must be 
signed and stamped by an internal and external auditor who audited the extractive company or 
government institution received the funds as a tax paid (ibid). Also, openness in revenue 
collection is revealed more in auditing the revenue collected as being conducted by an 
independent organization (ibid). 
    ….in order for us to be sure that the information filled in the template is correct, we require 
all entities to submit a signed and stamped templated filled by internal and external auditors 
in the time specified for submission… (Informant from Government). 
The payment of revenue collected from the agent (extractive industry) to the government is 
interpreted as a significant responsibility for extractive companies to pay the required tax to the 
government through the push monitored by the principal (TEITI). The transparency mechanism 




corruption claims can be detected and reduced through increasing openness in revenue 
collection. 
Moreover, the study found that the mining sector in Tanzania has published a report on the 
trend of what the government received as tax from extractive companies (TEITI, 2021). The 
publication of revenue collected is done as a requirement standard advocated by EITI for 
member states to implement this standard yearly (EITI, 2020). However, the revenue collected 
reports have been published from July 2008 to June 2019, with eleven reports published 
(HakiRasilimali, 2020; TEITI, 2021). The published report made by the principal (TEITI) helps 
to decrease information asymmetry from the agent (extractive companies). 
…. Transparency has increased because the TEITI report reveals the exact amount the 
extractive industries have paid the government. This was not indicated before the transparency 
reform in 2015…. However, it has made the public know what our government has been paid 
as the mandatory requirement in the mineral Act of 2010 and that of the Natural Wealth and 
Resource Contracts (Review and Renegotiations of Unconscionable Terms) Act of 2017 and 
the Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act of 2017…(NGO Informant ) 
…..Mining revenue report is published annually and has become increasingly clearly reported 
as nothing is hidden. Even those areas not included in the report, like small-scale miners, were 
not available in large quantities. Still, after adopting the changes in the Natural Wealth and 
Resource Contracts (Review and Renegotiations of Unconscionable Terms) Act of 2017 and 
the Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act of 2017, all miners are 
included in the publication report, and it has enhanced them to sell their mining at the 
established domestic market…(Informant from Government) 
Publication of revenue reports to the society made by TEITI through the website page is 
interpreted as a significant measure to control and monitor corruption in the mining sector. 
Because any corruption allegation can be traced and detected through publishing a report in 
which differences are detected and establish the cause ground. However, the established ground 
can shed light on how corruption has been played within the mining sector. Moreover, the 
published report helps the principal (society) to understand their specific right as a mandatory 




In the healthcare sector, the study found that the principal-agent theory uses transparency to 
control corruption through the centralisation of procuring healthcare commodities online. The 
Public Procurement Act No 7 of 2011 gives the principal (auditors, CSOs and health team) the 
ability to control corruption from the agent (Pharmacists) by following the e-procurement 
guidelines. The guidelines for procuring healthcare commodities (medical tools and drugs) 
involves a list of requirements from Pharmacists of a healthcare facility to the Medical Store 
Department (MSD) online. The MSD is a central government medical organization responsible 
for the distribution of approved medicines and healthcare tools to all public healthcare facilities, 
which is available in ten zones within Tanzania (Public Procurement Act No 7 of 2011; PCCB 
Manual in Procurement, 2019; Public Procurement (Amendment) Act, 2016). 
…in recent days, it is compulsory for a pharmacist to present healthcare facilities, including 
medicines and medical tools, to MSD through an online channel, who is the only bidder 
distributing medicine to all public healthcare facilities….. (Informant from NGOs) 
However, Pharmacists present the requirement to Medical Store Department (MSD) through 
the online system known as Electronic Logistic Management Information System (ELMIS). 
The system requires a pharmacist to prepare a requirement list online and send it to a regional 
pharmacist for approval and then to Medical Store Department for supplying the requirement 
to the applicant (Procurement Regulation 2013; PCCB Manual in Procurement, 2019; Public 
Procurement (Amendment) Act, 2016). The informants from the government revealed the 
below experiences. 
….In presenting medical requirements to MSD, we use the online system, namely ELMIS, which 
requires us to present it to the regional pharmacist for approval or recommend any change. It 
has to be sent to MSD to supply the requested requirement. (Government Representative) 
Also, once the presented requirements are not available at the MSD, the MSD sends back the 
out-of-stock list of medicines to the requested healthcare facility to continue procuring to other 
suppliers. The procurement process allowed by the Medical Store Department (MSD) to the 
respective healthcare facility is to be made online through the Tanzania National e-Procurement 
System (TANEPS) system. However, the procurement process is completed under TANEPS 
from the procurement division of the healthcare facility, which is also centralized to one 





…in case MSD sends back a list of out of stock, we take the list to the procurement division to 
procure the medical requirement through TANEPS, which is also centralised to one supplier 
(Government Respondent). 
For example, the bidder responsible for supplying healthcare requirements to the Coast Region 
has been given the supplying tender for three years. Furthermore, the bidder is obliged to 
provide the medical necessity with no option of being out of stock (Public Procurement 
(Amendment) Act, 2016; GPSA establishment order 2007). 
The process of centralising procurement of medical tools made by Medical Store Department 
through an online base, and that of Tanzania National e-Procurement System (TANEPS) to be 
centralised to one bidder, translates that the principal manages to monitor and control the agent 
through transparency in medical procurement. Also, the principal plays the role of increasing 
transparency to be made more open to the public and help remove favouritism that could 
encourage corruption by the agent. This is similar to the study conducted in Ukraine, which 
shows that e-procurement that uses the system known as ProZorro increased transparency and 
built a competitive trust among bidders and increased accountability to officials responsible for 
it (Kohler & Dimancesco, 2020). 
8.1.2 Public Awareness 
The research findings from the government and NGO informants for public awareness within 
the mining sector found that corruption risk awareness has increased among public and private 
officials working in the extractive industry (PCCB, 2018). The knowledge has been enlarged 
to understand the negative impact of corruption on their daily activities and life in general. The 
corruption risks being provided relate to the source of corruption, legal consequences for 
involving in corrupt behaviour, the importance of reporting corrupt allegations, and bearing 
witness at the court (PCCB Strategic Plan 2017-2022). 
However, awareness has raised in society minds because of an effort to educate people working 
in this sector through various instituted measures (PCCB, 2018). Actions that have contributed 
to increasing knowledge of corruption risk to workers are through training, seminars, 
workshops, online PCCB TV available on YouTube in the name of TAKUKURU TV—aired 
TV and radio programs three times a week, newsletters and magazines, and corruption 




…one of the essential roles PCCB and TEITI have made is to educate small scale miners and 
large-scale miners on the impact of corruption through regular training and seminars…. PCCB 
usually teach and coach them how to report corruption allegation and raise their awareness 
on the matter (NGO informant).  
According to the PCCB Act of 2007, raising awareness in the society on corruption risk is a 
sustainable educating plan made often by PCCB to the private and public sectors. The format 
of teaching the community about preventing corruption is through a prepared training road map 
plan, incorporating civil society organizations like HakiRasilimali, Konrad Adenauer-Stiftung 
and policy forum to deliver the coaching knowledge to the community (PCCB, 2020). The 
training involves dialogue sections, questions and answers, dramas, exhibitions, inflatable 
balloon screen shows, and leaflets and magazines for further self-readings (PCCB, 2019).  The 
awareness-raising aims to increase corruption understanding to the principal (citizens, public 
officials) to prevent corruption by refusing to pay it, reporting corruption incidences to PCCB 
for punishment and bear witness at the court (PCCB, 2020). 
Additionally, a platform for reporting corruption allegations has been expanded for the 
Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB) to initiate a PCCB App for android 
users (PCCB, 2019). The app provides space for a reporter to record audio, video and send 
messages to PCCB. Also, social media's platform works well on Twitter, Facebook, Instagram 
and individuals because reporters on this platform are responded on time (ibid). Furthermore, 
other existing reporting methods are writing open and secret letters and presenting them to 
PCCB, free toll number 113, complaint tables, and dropping opinions in the suggestion boxes 
(PCCB, 2019). 
…and the other thing PCCB have made is to expand the reporting platform. In recent days, you 
can report the recorded corruption allegation on your smartphone in your hand and send it to 
PCCB directly without being known from a suspected person…(NGO Informant). 
The increased knowledge on corruption risk to public and private officials provide us with the 
understanding that effort to mitigate corruption according to principal-agent theory is 
contributed with the level of awareness being promoted within the mind of principal and agent 
(society).  The principal (individual with awareness of corruption risk) takes the necessary 
action to control the agent (individuals who are corrupt) by reporting them to the anti-corruption 




knowledge disseminated in the principal’s mind. In theory, the more awareness raised, the more 
decrease in corruption practice, which should go along with implemented punishment (Byrne 
et al., 2010). 
Likewise, the finding in this study noted that awareness of corruption risks in the healthcare 
sector have also increased to healthcare personnel and suppliers. The corruption risk knowledge 
is disseminated to health personnel, suppliers, and citizens through seminars, workshops, and 
training on the matter and pregnant women during clinic visits (PCCB, 2018; PCCB, 2019). 
Still, more importantly, within the healthcare sector, there are stickers on doctors’ doors written 
no corruption and, on the advertisement board, there is information placed there showing no 
corruption at this premises (Persson et al. 2013; PCCB, 2019).  
… also, PCCB, in cooperation with CSO, have managed to train healthcare personnel and 
pregnant women on the issue of ethics at the workplace, risk of corruption and emphasises the 
importance of removing corruption at the workplace…(Government informant) 
Additionally, the reporting mechanism is done through secret informants who work in secret to 
detect any corruption allegation harming the sector and report to the Prevention and Combating 
of Corruption Bureau (PCCB) directly for investigation. Furthermore, the increased corruption 
knowledge within the healthcare sector has influenced hospital management to announce often 
all medicines and prices available on the advertisement board (PCCB Strategic Plan 2017-
2022). 
…. apart from using toll-free call number 113, sending short messages, social media and the 
PCCB App…PCCB has expanded reporting of corruption allegations through informants who 
report corruption claims on secret bases and are unknown to ordinary people… (Informant 
Government). 
Awareness-raising made in the healthcare sector through secret informants, and regular 
seminars and training to healthcare personnel can be translated as an excellent method to 
emphasise ethics and discipline at the workplace. According to principal-agent theory, 
awareness-raising contributes to the increase of transparency for service provision to the 
principal (citizen) who control the agent (health personnel) on corruption trend. This is because 
the listing of received medicine prices on the advertisement board gives the principal the 




corruption acts. It is also a significant sign of increasing transparency in medicine management 
to the principal (public) (Shah &Schacter, 2004). 
8.1.3 Oversight 
The study noted that oversight in the mining sector is conducted by the principal (TEITI), who 
are responsible for counter-checking the amount paid as a tax by the agent (extractive 
companies) and what the government has received (Poncian & Kigodi, 2018). Auditing made 
by Tanzania Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (TEITI) is done once per year, and 
when it notices a considerable difference in their reconciliation report, the principal (TEITI) 
requests the Controller and Auditor General to conduct a special audit to establish a ground 
cause of the differences to monitor the corrupt trend of the agent.  However, as per the Natural 
Wealth and Resource Contracts (Review and Renegotiations of Unconscionable Terms) Act of 
2017 and the Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act of 2017 and Mining 
Act of 2010, Mining Commission (MC) has also the power to conduct general auditing of 
mining operations in Tanzania. Also, auditing made by the principal (Mining Commission) 
inspects a balance of minerals that remained in the ground, mineral produced, and minerals sold 
per each mining site (TEITA Act, 2015; Mining Act, 2010).  
…often, an audit is made by TEITI to counter check what extractive companies have paid as a 
tax and what the government have received from extractive companies…. Also, Mining 
Commission has been given power by the Natural Wealth and Resource Contracts (Review and 
Renegotiations of Unconscionable Terms) Act of 2017 and the Natural Wealth and Resources 
(Permanent Sovereignty) Act of 2017, and the Mining Act of 2010 to conduct auditing in the 
mining site by inspecting minerals in-ground, minerals produced and minerals are taken to the 
market for sale... (NGO Informant). 
Additionally, minerals auditing is often carried out by investigators from the mining 
commission. The reform made by Natural Wealth and Resource Contracts (Review and 
Renegotiations of Unconscionable Terms) Act of 2017 and the Natural Wealth and Resources 
(Permanent Sovereignty) Act of 2017 have helped to increase auditing budget, made easier for 
a resource available like working allowance, vehicles, fuels, and auditing garments. However, 
auditing reports are published on Ministry of Minerals and Mining commission websites. 
People can access and get the awareness of what has been produced, sold, and remained in the 




Therefore, auditing conducted by the principal (TEITI and MC) explains how the principal 
control agent (extractive companies) in reducing corruption in the mining sector. The 
monitoring mechanism is fundamentally aligned with legal reforms, practical implementation 
of the laws and accountability for public and private officials. Hence, it makes it easier for 
detected corrupt claims to be revealed as several investigations are being made and published 
to the community for interrogation and institute punishment for agents who violate those laws 
by being involved in corrupt behaviour (Diganyeck, 2018). 
In the healthcare sector, findings have revealed that oversight is being conducted by the 
principal (Controller and Auditor General (CAG)), who investigate financial audits and 
compliance audits of the agent (healthcare facility). Also, the healthcare sector is being 
examined by healthcare personnel who counter-check healthcare activities' operations to all 
public and private healthcare facilities. The audited report published in the healthcare sector 
sheds light for the principal (CSO, journalists, media, and Parliament Social Services and 
Community Development Committee) to conduct watchdog investigations on the corruption 
matter portrayed by the agent (pharmacists) and provide recommendations. The CAG report 
does indicate public financial expenditure and detects corruption allegations that caused the 
loss of public money. Additionally, the audited CAG report is published on the CAG website 
and be open to everyone to access (Pelizzo & Kinyondo, 2014).  
…investigation in the healthcare sector is made by CAG and is a priority to be investigated… 
however, healthcare policies provide opportunity space for CSO to cooperate with the 
government in monitoring healthcare facilities…(NGO Informant). 
…In Tanzania, auditing is a good monitoring tool that helps to detect corruption, but the 
challenges are that most CAG recommendations are not taken into grave account to be 
implemented... (NGO Informant). 
Furthermore, the CAG conducted an investigation on the National Healthcare Insurance Funds 
(NHIF) responsible for healthcare insurance in Tanzania. According to the collective action 
theory, the group of actors, CAG, act on the honest side by revealing corrupt acts made by the 
health personnel and medical store owner actor through auditing. The audited report does 
indicate the loss of a lot of money made by agents (healthcare personnel in collaboration with 
medical store owners). It is found that medical personnel write a forgery and an overpayment 




medicines. For example, the special audit made in July 2021 for NHIF transactions in the 
Kilimanjaro region detected that Kilimanjaro Christian Medical Centre and Mawenzi hospitals 
are alleged to involve in corrupt practices2. The allegation involved the forgery of losing TZS 
520 million, at which responsible investigation bodies are working on this case and will institute 
substantial measures, including taking them to court3. The other example is that the CAG report 
for the financial year 2018/2019 indicates that TZS 1.4 billion NHIF claims were rejected as 
subjected to corruption from 19 referral hospitals (CAG Report 2018/2019, 2020). 
In general, the auditing made by CAG translates to us that the principal (CAG) is an important 
monitoring tool to control the utilization of public funds with compliance with laws. However, 
it is not easy to reduce corruption while other groups of actors act on the dishonest side and 
believe that the other group is also corrupt. However, the group of actors (CAG) who act on 
the honest side can monitor agents by abiding and following the laws, which can help prevent 
corruption from harming the healthcare sector. However, due to the ineffective implementation 
of CAG recommendations, corruption remains a distorting practice in this sector, requiring 
treatment by effectively working on CAG (principal) punishments (Dye & Stapenhurst,1998).  
8.2.0 How have these efforts worked to reduce corruption in the Mining and Healthcare 
sector? 
8.2.1 Transparency 
The study found that transparency in the mining sector has reduced corruption by making 
reconciliation reports open to the public. The transparency reform that resulted in obtaining the 
TEITA Act in 2015 has significantly pushed for the growth of transparency management in the 
mining sector by increasing report publication and controlling government funds' loss. For 
example, from 2009 to 2019, TEITI has published 11 reports showing growth of the mining 
sector, the amount the government gained as revenue collection, and differences in revenue 
collection. 
…also, TEITI is working well to control corruption; nowadays, there are about 11 reports 
published showing revenue collected by the government to the public…. this report has helped 








local government not to demand corporate social responsibility packages made every year. If 
they do so, the report will put them open... (NGO Informant). 
Additionally, there is good governance of controlling transparency in mining operations made 
by the principal (TEITI and MC). TEITI does make a deep follow up on what revenue is paid 
by the extractive industry by sending them a template that should be filled in a specified time 
(TEITA Act, 2015). TEITI employs an independent company to conduct a review and 
reconciliation assignment to make transparency more realistic. This activity is undertaken in 
comparative confirmation on between what the agent (company) paid and what the government 
received. In this regard, there is a relative achievement of the principal to control the agent in 
the principal-agent modal on what the company (agent) paid and what the government received. 
For example, in the year covering 2017 to 2018, a total of 31 mining companies paid a revenue 
of worth of Tzs 732.3 billion to the government, and the government confirmed to have 
received Tzs 728.9 billion. This indicated a discrepancy of 3.4 TZS billion, which is under 
reconciliation. However, this achievement is well improved compared to 2008/2009, which had 
a difference of $37 million (Johnsøn, 2012; TEITI Act, 2015; Poncian & Kigodi, 2018; TEITI 
report, 2020).  
However, transparency in the mining Commission (MC) has been strengthened by conducting 
effective follow up by ensuring extractive companies pay what is obliged to pay according to 
the laws. Also, the principal (Mining Commission) works to simplify the application for a 
license online through the mining cadastre portal, at which the applicant receives a response 
within 14 days from the day application is made. 
…now, the mining commission has developed a mining cadastre portal that has simplified 
applications to be made online in an open way… the outlet has helped reduce corruption, 
simplify application time, and reduce complaints on licence applications….(Informant from 
Government). 
Generally, it can be translated that transparency helps to reduce corruption when there is an 
exemplary implementation of legal reforms made by principals (TEITI and MC), adequate 
follow-up, willingness to follow the rules by the agent (mining companies) and community 
participation in mining operations. However, making revenue collection open to the public, 




significantly helped the growth of transparency in a mining operation in Tanzania. This growth 
has also managed to help in reducing corruption (Poncian & Kigodi, 2018) 
Likewise, transparency has been seen to reduce corruption in the procurement of healthcare 
commodities to be online rather than on paper. The procurement is centralised to MSD as the 
sole distributor of healthcare commodities to all public healthcare facilities through ELMIS and 
to one bidder approved in a regional wise to supply medicines to all public healthcare facilities 
in the region through TANEPS. Also, upon receiving requested healthcare commodities like 
medicines, the principal (internal management team) confirms the tally upon safe receipt of the 
consignment per the ordered list against the received list made by the agent (pharmacist).  
….in reality, the healthcare sector has improved mechanisms to control corruption…we see 
recently, procurement of medicines is done online to either MSD or a single supplier…this 
makes it easy for suppliers and healthcare officers not to be involved; in corruption, because 
they do no longer meet anywhere…(NGO Informant). 
In addition, as per informants from NGOs, there is an increase of transparency made through 
placing a list of medicine prices received and the cost for each healthcare service on the hospital 
advertisement board. Putting these services on the advertisement board aims to reduce 
corruption and raise awareness of the public's actual price per medicine and service. 
…when you go to the hospital, you will realize that prices for medicines and healthcare services 
are listed on the advertisement board… this has increased transparency which automatically 
reduces corruption…(NGO Informant). 
Apart from this effort to reduce corruption in the healthcare sector through transparency, there 
are still corrupt problems where a group of pharmacists (agent/ actor) act on dishonest sides 
and steal medicine in the medical store4. Also, the other problem is that healthcare personnel 
(agents) behave dishonestly while believing other groups of actors (external medical store 
owners) also act on the dishonest side. Existing evidence suggests that corrupt health personnel 
collude with each other to forge bills to extract overpayment costs on NHIF documents and 








Therefore, it can be translated that e-procurement help to improve transparency in procurement 
of healthcare commodities and automatically control corruption by distancing supplier and 
healthcare personnel. But in other way, it fails to control corruption perceived as expected 
behaviour within group of actors in the healthcare sector.  
8.2.2 Public Awareness 
The study results noted that awareness-raising on corruption risks has increased to public and 
private officials in the mining sector. There is a relative decrease in reporting grand corruption 
allegations to PCCB influenced by awareness of the corrupt knowledge to the agent (investor). 
For example, in 2018/2019, a total number of 911 corruption allegation cases were reported 
and presented to the court for punishment, of which seven were cases of grand corruption, while 
in the year 2016/2017, the total number of 575 corruption allegations cases were reported and 
submitted to the court for punishment in which 16 were cases of grand corruption (PCCB, 
2020).  
…there is also an increase of corruption reports made through the PCCB App from various 
reporters who have become aware of corruption risk and report the incidences immediately 
once they suspect it... (Informant from Government). 
Also, the reduction in reporting is caused by the strengthening of legal reforms, several ethics 
seminars, training, workshops, and exhibition that has raised the understanding of rights and 
responsibilities to the agent (investor) (PCCB, 2019). For example, in the mining sector, 
corruption complaints in the license division have decreased because public officials (principal) 
and investors (agent) follow the rules and regulations. However, strengthening license 
applications to be online and a response to be made in no more than two weeks have influenced 
the reduction of corruption claims (PCCB 2018, PCCB 2019, PCCB, 2020). 
…and we see people and investors understand a lot on corruption risks, …. Because investors 
often ask what should they do for them not to involve in any mistakes including corrupt practice. 
We do tell them to follow the rules and regulations… but it has dramatically reduced corruption 
because legal reforms are followed by public and private officials…(Informant from the 
Government). 
Therefore, the growth of legal reforms, expansion of reporting mechanisms and increased 




individuals) by reporting and taking them to court. The multiple efforts made through training 
and seminars to impact corrupt awareness of the community in the mining sector suggests that 
raising awareness is crucial sustainability of the process that help principals to become aware 
of corruption matters and take action to reduce corruption. Also, the awareness raised help to 
promote faithfulness and report corrupt claims to the respective anti-corruption body for 
punishment. 
Consequently, in the healthcare sector, the study found that awareness-raising have 
inadequately managed to reduce corruption because medicines in the healthcare facilities and 
MSD stores are stolen (Mamdani et al., 2018; CAG Report 2018/2019, 2020). For example, the 
CAG report in 2019/2020 noted the robbery loss of healthcare commodities worth Tzs 11.9 
million (CAG Report 2019/2020, 2021). 
In general, it can be discussed that transparency in the healthcare sector has somehow improved 
to control grand corruption due to the use of online e-procurement. But it has not improved the 
mechanism to handle it because healthcare officials who act on the dishonest side are in 
collective action dilemma (Persson et al. 2013).  
8.2.3 Oversight 
The findings in this research observed that oversight conducted by auditors help to reduce 
corruption in the mining sector by doing several mining inspections done by the mining 
commission (Agent) (Poncian & Kigodi, 2018). According to the Mining Act of 2010, MC 
conducts regular mining operation assessments by involving a team of inspectors from the 
mining commission, ministry of defence, attorney general, treasury, land management, and 
local government authority. The inspection is carried out on a work plan and implementation 
of law in an open way. However, there are often changes of professionals who go to inspect the 
operation of mining to not engage in corrupt activities. 
….and the good news in these days is that audit is very transparency because to avoid 
corruption, the audit team is secretly made to appoint members from local government, 
treasury, security and safety institution, and mining commission, and decisions are decided by 
the whole team transparently and who at the end of the task sign the agreement sheet for 




Additionally, inspections made look on environment management, implementation of local 
content, number of minerals produced and number of minerals sold. Also, in every mining site, 
mining resident officers work day and night to supervise mining operations from production, 
smelting, and despatch for sale (Mining Act of 2010). 
The presence of professionals (principals) from different institutions who are secretly appointed 
to cooperate with the MC in inspecting mining operations can be translated that mining laws 
and regulations give ability the principal to control agents (investors) from engaging in corrupt 
acts. However, following the rules and laws that guide mining operation by conducting several 
audits in a transparency way help to reduce corruption loopholes.    
In the healthcare sector, mechanisms to control corruption have reduced corruption by 
conducting several medical store inspections. The integrated measure made in the healthcare 
sector intervene in the tracking of the received healthcare commodities and distribution 
produced from the healthcare facility store to the pharmacy. However, healthcare commodities 
inspection is regularly conducted at local government authority, regional authority, Ministry 
level and CAG. 
…there is a committee team from the hospital management that conduct regular inspections of 
healthcare commodities and the intervention from the regional level, ministry level and CAG 
who often come to audit the trend of medicine and other medical tools…(NGO Informant). 
Therefore, the mechanism to control corruption in the healthcare sector by inspecting healthcare 
commodities by involving different levels of healthcare management can be translated as a 
significant effort to reduce corruption. Also, it might need more effort to monitor the trend of 
medical stores since available medical in-store at public healthcare facilities and MSD premises 
are being stolen at the ground of health officials (agent) who act on the dishonest side. 
8.3.0 why have these measures worked differently to reduce corruption in different 
contexts? 
As the discussion above shows, anti-corruption measures have had a greater impact in the 
mining sector than in healthcare. This section seeks to understand the main challenges in anti-




8.3.1 Transparency  
The study noted that transparency in the healthcare sector which works on e-government for 
procurement of health commodities and services to be open to the citizen by putting health 
services on advertisement board has contributed to reducing corruption in few successes. In 
particular, leaving the industry with susceptible to corruption in terms of embezzlement and 
cheating (forgery)6. 
The service of writing on paper rather than online service to the National Health Insurance 
Fund (NHIF) sheets provide an opportunity for a group of actors such as agent (medical doctors, 
and external medical store owners) and principal (head of hospitals) to play corrupt practice 
which is in the line of collective action theory. According to collective action theory, corruption 
occurs when a group of actors believe that other actors act on dishonest sides and motivate 
corruption to be expected behaviour (Persson et al., 2013). The existing evidence indicates that 
an agent (medical doctors) forgery NHIF sheet by writing a false overpayment bill and present 
to another agent (external medical store owner (is regarded as an agent because of having 
information on how cheating of NHIF sheet work)) for payment execution in collaboration with 
the principal who involves in this corrupt game to gain unlawful money7. 
In addition, the Controller and Auditor General (CAG) report of 2019/2020 indicated that 
National Health Insurance Funds (NHIF) rejected totalling of TZS 3.13 billion being subjected 
to overcharging of the service above the NHIF prices, double charging of the prescribed items, 
and insufficient patient’s details made by the agents and principals (CAG Report 2019/2020, 
2021). This report was only reported from three hospitals and two major academic institutions. 
However, greed that led to short-term benefits and lack of working discipline resulted from the 
weak enforcement of legal framework led the agent (healthcare personnel and external medical 
store owners) to keep playing the corrupt acts in secret out of transparency which is in according 
to collective action theory that posits that group of actors are endowed with corrupt behaviour. 
For example, one of the informants from NGOs explained that grand corruption is about greed 
found in public officials with higher authority.  
 
6 https://www.pccb.go.tz/images/stories/joomlart/UCHUNGUZI/PRESS.pdf 




   …. you know grand corruption is highly concerned with public officials having the higher 
rank of authority who decide on behalf of others in the public institutions…these officials 
involved in corrupt behaviours because of greed, a personal gain which is associated with the 
low salary, low allowances and need to be rich in a short time. (NGO Informant). 
In this regard, transparency that is expected to control the embezzlement of healthcare 
commodities available in the medical store fails to produce desired prevention results 
(Rashidian et al., 2012).  
Also, the other factor that challenges transparency in reducing corruption is the little ability to 
punish corrupt behaviour inherited from top principals (decision-makers) who engage in a 
corrupt practice that infects other healthcare personnel to play it by stealing medical from the 
store (Sforza et al., 2020; Vian et al., 2012). This argument is in line with collective action 
theory, which asserts that a group of actors (decision-makers) lack trust in controlling corrupt 
crime performed by their subordinates because they are also involved in corruption practice 
(Persson et al., 2013). The informant interviewed from NGOs revealed that corruption is a 
mutation that moves from one person to another.  
… corruption behaviour is a mutation; people keep changing in a short time like a chameleon 
for a specific time. For example, when you visit a hospital for healthcare services, you might 
be told different costs from different healthcare personnel.. (NGO Informant). 
For example, the medical store department (MSD) report in Tanzania revealed a loss of TZS 
500 billion of a drug shortage in 2016, limiting the agency's ability to meet the country demand 
for medicines supply (Mamdani et al., 2018). Also, the healthcare minister suspended four 
MSD directors for alleged misuse of Tzs 1.5 billion. However, it has been found that corruption 
is rampant in the healthcare sector because of poor coordination among different actors and 
inadequate transparency mechanisms to control the habit of stealing medicines and misusing 
public funds (ibid).  
Therefore, the presence of agents (public officials) who conduct the unlawful practice of 
corrupt behaviour can be translated that corruption is expected behaviour that keeps moving 
from one person to another. That is to say, if the high-rank officials involve in corruption 




corruption. However, all of these practices limit the capacity for healthcare to deliver quality 
service to the public. 
8.3.2 Awareness-raising  
This body of research found that awareness-raising in the healthcare sector has been well 
increased to healthcare personnel, suppliers and private medical store owners. But despite the 
increase in educating the community on corruption risk, there is a decrease in reporting 
mechanisms caused by fearing to lose working position (Batory, 2012). It is not easy for a 
person to report corrupt behaviour made by a supervisor who appointed them to control grand 
corruption in medical stores. The informant from NGOs bears the argument that corrupt 
activities being made by the supervisor create a room of fear for a subordinate to report it to the 
respective body. This is also in the line of collective action theory which argues that those 
actors involved to prevent corruption are the ones who engage and benefit in corrupt behaviours 
(Persson et al., 2013). 
…it is not easy that this procedure has managed to control corruption in the healthcare sector 
since their supervisor appoints healthcare personnel who work to inspect and maintain medical 
facilities. It is hard for them to reveal their supervisor when they are involved in corrupt acts… 
they can not do so because of fear of losing their working position (NGO Informant). 
This argument was revealed in a study to understand why ant corruption fails in limiting 
systematic corruption, which arrived at the assumption that it is not easy for the actors to bite 
the hand that feeds them (Persson et al., 2013). This influence actors not to report corruption 
allegations because they will be no longer get money for their living. 
8.3.3 Oversight 
The interviews and document analysis reveals that oversight faces a challenge of little 
punishment for a confirmed corrupt crime. Both interviews and documents show that corrupt 
crime being charged to a corrupt person is at a low level of a penalty compared to the cost 
caused. However, low penalty charges that do not reflect the crime committed continue 
embarrassing corrupt behaviour in which a corrupt person continues doing it while knows that 
even if caught, there will be a low penalty to pay as compared to the cost he has caused. In this 
regard, it continues to be prevalent in people’s minds as a normative behaviour because the 
audit is made, the investigation is made, and the court confirms beyond reasonable doubt that 




of comparison to the wrongdoing made. For example, according to the PCCB report of 
2017/2018 (2019), one individual was alleged to commit corruption that cost TZS 9.3 million 
and charged to pay a fine of TZS 500,000.00. 
…however, the legal system is not fair since people are caught by the court with a corruption 
case and being judged to pay a fine which is less than the cost of a corruption case… for sure; 
this discourages reporting mechanism influence corruption habit and also depress auditing 
made…(NGO Informant). 
The other factor associated with corruption in oversight is the Poor implementation of the 
auditor’s recommendation due to weak capacity and weak law enforcement. According to 
collective action theory, corruption can be mitigated when a broad-based transparency 
requirement is greatly increasing monitoring mechanisms and strengthening sanctions on those 
engaging in corrupt practices (Marquette & Peiffer,2015; Persson et al., 2013). The 
recommendations advised by auditors rely on preventing corruption by obeying the law, 
honestly using transparency, stopping carelessness and laziness at the workplace and 
strengthening the legal framework. The recommendation also explains the cost effect caused 
by corrupt practices that harm institutions ability to provide healthcare service on time and even 
become short of stock to supply medicine and medical devices for the case of MSD (CAG 
report 2019/2020, 2021; Mikongoti et al., 2018). 
…most CAG recommendations are not implemented in our country, … if this could full be 
implemented, we could have already been at a higher level of controlling corruption…(NGO 
Informant). 
Therefore, incomparable crimes against corruption cost and low level of implementing 
auditor’s recommendation are interpreted as a factor that extending corrupt acts in society. 
However, a way to prevent corruption based on this factor is to strengthen the law's 
implementation that provides punishment as a penalty for those who have not implemented 
auditor recommendations without sound reasonable.  
8.4.0 Discussions 
8.4.1. Similarities 
The research finding in this study indicates that both the healthcare and mining sectors use 




both sectors, as seen in the procurement of medicals equipment, medicines, and application of 
mining licence permits to be made online. The research result presents that an integrative 
measure to provide services online helps to reduce corruption by minimising the distance 
between the service provider and receiver. Public awareness is possibly applied in both sectors 
by educating workers and actors integrating with these sectors on corruption risks and platforms 
for reporting corruption allegations. The findings suggest that awareness-raising helps the 
principals take the necessary action to report corruption allegations, refuse to pay corruption, 
and monitor agents on corruption acts. And the oversight is exercised in both sectors through 
auditing made to detect corruption allegations by publishing a report to be known to the public. 
Also, research detected that these measures have had some impact on reducing grand corruption 
to both sectors through the effective implementation of auditing. The auditing made helped to 
detect corruption and suggested recommendations on how to prevent and reduce corruption. 
The other similarity is on publication of the audited report. Both sectors publish an audited 
report to the public on their website. The published report made open to citizens provides a 
greater opportunity for the public to read and get informed of the detected corruption allegation. 
The publication of the audited report to the public is crucial in addressing civic engagement in 
helping to control corruption since it gives the public a participatory opportunity to discuss the 
report and advise a way forward. 
8.4.2 Differences 
The use of legal implementation is different in the two sectors. The study found that the 
performance of the Mining Act of 2010, Natural Wealth and Resource Contracts (Review and 
Renegotiations of Unconscionable Terms) Act of 2017 and the Natural Wealth and Resources 
(Permanent Sovereignty) Act of 2017 and the TEITA Act 2015 have improved to work well in 
the mining sector. This is because there is regular follow up on the implementation of the Acts 
guiding mining operation. There are several inspections of mines in the ground, produced and 
taken to the market, being conducted by the mining commission (MC). Follow up of payment 
as revenue is also made by Tanzania Extractive Industries Transparency Initiatives (TEITI) 
through an independent organization. Also, there are an increase in the control mechanism of 
mines produced reporting from large- and small-scale producers. Furthermore, the application 
for licence permit is conducted online, which help to control probability for licence applicant 




In contrast to the healthcare sector, the research findings noted that the implementation of the 
health policy of 2017 has not yet worked well to control and reduce corruption in the sector. 
The healthcare sector has managed to control corruption based on procurement being made 
online, reduce the distance to meet with suppliers, and centralise medical suppliers to be MSD. 
Also, the implementation of inspecting medicines and medical equipment is conducted through 
several national, regional, and district levels to control the stealing of medicines. Yet medicines 
available in the stock are nonetheless being stolen by pharmacists. This might probably be done 
because most medical stores in public health facilities lack cameral installation, which can help 
control the movement of in and out of medicines and enhance the reduction of corrupt 
behaviour. There is also forgery of NHIF sheet made by health personnel in collaboration with 
external medical owners and corrupt behaviour detected at MSD for government officials 
involved in this unethical behaviour. 
How are agent personnel (health personnel in corroboration with external medical owners) and 
principal (head of hospital management) involved in corrupt behaviour that dwells in collective 
action theory? They involve because corruption is experienced and expected behaviour in 
which every actor is expected to act on the dishonest side. For example, health personnel 
(medical doctors, nurses and pharmacists) and external medical owners are regarded as agents, 
and heads of hospital management are considered principals who play a game of corruption by 
forgery government NHIF documents to get unlawful money. The agent who has access to 
information for NHIF sheets writes on the NHIF sheet false overbilling payment and takes it to 
the other agent (medical store owner) for executing payment implementation. 
The other reason is fearing losing their work position, and they won't report despite the 
expanded reporting mechanism such as PCCB App. Corruption is being exercised by both the 
health personnel in the corporation with top medical personnel and external medical store 
owners. The healthcare workers receive instruction from their subordinates to play a corrupt 
game by writing false information on NHIF sheets and sending them to medical store owners 
to get unlawful money. 
Moreover, the weak legal system results in greed, leading to the rapidly gaining of unlawful 
money to a pharmacist and medical store owner. As collective action theories argue that greed 
enhances corrupt behaviour to prevail in a group of actors, it creates an expansion of corrupt 




such as buying a good luxury car, house, and running a good business in a short period, which 
pushes them to be involved in corrupt behaviour.  
The other difference is on punishment implementation. The Mining Commission and Tanzania 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiatives have the legal power to punish investors and 
public officials involved in corrupt behaviour. For example, investors interested in unethical 
behaviour are punished by fines, ceasing their license and even taken to court. For public 
officials are also taken to the disciplinary committee or the court for further action. The 
relationship between the principal (Public official) and agent (investor) is built on believing 
that the principal can help the agent to receive service based on favouritism in the line of 
principal-agent theory. When the agent is caught and fined to pay the fine, the agent requests 
the principal not to record the fine on the control number (electronic payment system) by giving 
them desirable corrupt money for him to be safe. Sometimes the agent requests relief of the 
payment of the fine to be little from the level of a mistake committed. This is done at a low 
level since several inspections are being conducted to detect corruption and several officials 
fear engaging in corrupt acts.  
Contrary to the healthcare sector, the implementation of legal penalty work on the disciplinary 
committee and at the court, but no fine is provided to the agent who committed the corrupt 
crime on the spot. The court offers punishment once it has approved that the agent has 
committed the corrupt crime and is entitled to the punishment charges. Interestingly, 
punishment offered from the court is sometimes little compare to the cost caused. This problem 
continues to keep people engaging in corrupt behaviour. 
Also,  there is a difference in publishing an audited report to the public in these two sectors. In 
the mining sector, the audited report is directly published by TEITI and Mining Commission 
on their website after confirmed that the report is correct for publication.  
In contrast to the healthcare sector, an audited report is published by the Controller and Auditor 
General on the website. The report is also presented to the president and taken to the parliament 
for further debate (CAG Report, 2020). Members of parliament advise the government on what 





9. Conclusion and Recommendations 
The thesis presents a comparative study examining the effectiveness of anti-corruption 
measures to mitigate corruption in mining and healthcare to explain why anti-corruption 
measures succeed in one sector and fall short in another. The mitigation of corruption in the 
mining and healthcare sectors depends on anti-corruption measures' effectiveness to prevent 
and fight corruption in two sectors. Existing literature review points out that transparency might 
effectively reduce corruption in the mining sector when legal reforms propagate on the 
openness of information, mainly revenue obtained from mining production to the public. In the 
healthcare sector, transparency may reduce corruption when there is active usage of e-
procurement of health commodities which help to reduce personal discretion. Public awareness 
can reduce corruption when the campaign for corruption education is raised in the community 
and help the society to refuse to pay corruption and report the corrupt allegation to the anti-
corruption body for punishment. Oversight may help reduce corruption in the environment of 
auditing government institutions and remind employees to follow organization rules, and if 
they breach such company policy, they may be punished. Additionally, auditing help to detect 
corruption incidences through auditors’ observation ability and publish to the public. 
The analysis and results provide an interesting finding that transparency reduce corruption 
when there are institutional measures to fight corruption in the mining sectors. These 
institutional measures are publishing an open reconciliation report to the public to interrogate 
it, an open template for extractive companies to fill with the actual revenue paid to the 
government and an online mining application that distance between applicant and review team 
from the mining commission. While in the healthcare sector, transparency works online to 
procure health commodities and place health services and cost on the advertisement board. 
Mechanism to control corruption in the healthcare sector is still weak because there are forged 
practices on NHIF sheets and medicine theft in health facilities. 
Public awareness is effectively working to mitigate corruption due to a broader effort to educate 
the community on the adverse risk of corruption, reporting corruption allegations and bear 
witness at the court. As a result, there are decreases in reporting grand corruption in the mining 
sector due to larger knowledge of corruption in society. 
However, auditing work on effective follow up of mining inspections for mines in-ground, 




pay as revenue to the government and confirmation of receipt of revenue from the government. 
The auditing in the mining sector involves inspection teams from different institutions 
appointed in secret who conduct inspection open and increase the probability of not engaging 
in corrupt activities. In the healthcare sector, auditing is done by auditors and health teams 
appointed from the ministry of health, regional and district level to inspect trends of corruption 
in this sector. Auditing in the healthcare sector helps us know corruption allegations detected, 
especially forgery of NHIF documents and steal of medicine available in medical store 
premises, which is a prevalent problem within the sector that needs to be solved as soon as 
possible. 
The thesis presented the methodology of collecting data through interview and document 
analysis, which had challenges in gathering data. For example, meeting with interviewees was 
a challenge due to the covid-19 pandemic. Getting an appointment for an interview took a long 
time with a response from the institution planned to meet for an interview, and sometimes I 
lacked the funds to move around to meet with interviewees. Also, interpreting data was 
complex since it required to compare data in both sectors differently, but some of the anti-
corruption measures like public awareness look to work in both sectors with slight minor 
differences. Additionally, the thesis reflects that the outcome of reducing corruption depends 
on the reformation of the legal framework and effective implementation of legal reforms done 
by principals in an honest way through online services. However, I suggest the avenue for future 
research to explore an in-depth study on what can work better in implementing a legal 
framework in two sectors. Also, an effective way of alleviating forgery corruption of NHIF 
government documents and the essence of detective surveillance camera installation at all 
health premises, including the medical store, to mitigate corruption in the healthcare sector. 
The theories in Tanzania’s two cases help us to understand that corruption can be reduced when 
the principal has a strong ability to control agents from engaging in corrupt activities vested 
from strong implemented laws.  Also, one of the differences in mining and healthcare is that 
there are larger number of actors involved in healthcare than in mining, and they are spread all 
over the country. This might be the reason that makes it more difficult to control corruption 
make it harder to monitor, detect and punish in healthcare than in mining.  
Finally, I recommend that all NHIF sheets be made online for private and public health facilities 




false information for the purpose of getting unlawful monies. Also, installing a camera at all 
health premises would enhance the camera to detect the stealing of medical from the public 
medical store and promote the reduction of corruption in the healthcare sector.  
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